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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WARSAW PACT

INACTIVITY OF PEOPLE'S CONTROL IN GSFG REGIMENT EXAMINED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Kiryazov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "How the Patrols Were 'Educated'"]

[Text] When he got home that night he said:

"Maybe that really is enough."

His wife had never seen him that upset before. What had happened?

What had happened was what Guards Major O. Dorogan's sympathetic colleagues had warned him about on any number of occasions: "You really ought to back off a little on those inspections, Oleg Fedorovich, or you're going to run into some big trouble before too long." But he just smiled and said: "I'm not doing this for myself, you know." And then at the people's control group meeting he suggested a target for the next surprise inspection. The inspection completed, he himself presented the report to the regimental commander. And it was true that the commander had increasingly frequently been greeting him with a question which had begun to ring with some exasperation: "Well, what have you got piled up there this time?"

The rumor began to make the rounds within the unit that people were saying that Dorogan just had to be "put in his place." And they weren't off the mark. The check on the personal references then began, and in his personal record there appeared the negative term "hypercritical." True, a major correction is soon going to have to be entered in the efficiency report. But for now, we are still trying to find out what had earned this officer such an unflattering evaluation.

His official position is deputy battalion commander for political affairs. In his work he is energetic and enthusiastic. He has had his slip ups, of course. The Lenin Room in one of the subunits was not set up, on schedule let's say, and so he was also responsible for that. But overall, the officer has earned respect, a great deal of respect in fact and his subordinates simply adore him. He always deals with people openly and honestly. He makes his demands on people, but at the same time he shows his personal concern for them. Dorogan is not without his "quirks." He has set up nature corners in the companies: the chatter of birds, he believes, helps reduce psychological stress and helps people

forget their fatigue, and it's crowded at night here in these areas, which are now referred to as the "psychological relief" corners. But these aren't the only things that stand him in good stead with people, of course. He is also deputy chairman of the people's control group. He has done a lot to keep things running as they should around here. This position, of course, has spoiled his relationships with some people, but then his own personal welfare and satisfaction have always been the last of his concerns here.

Young Warrant Officer O. Abramenko now makes his appearance in the regiment where he is put in charge of the clothing store. The new man immediately begins to practice his "art": He issued Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Kovalchuk measured material which is supposed to go to junior officers, while in the case of Guards Captain A. Triputen he did not provide him with all the items on his invoice but nevertheless noted down that accounts were square with the captain. So, to make a long story short, he had now attracted the attention of the people's controllers.

The people's controllers came to have a look at the operation the warrant officer was running and found serious deficiencies. But for some reason the unit failed to take any action in the case. This took the intervention of the judge advocate. To the surprise of all concerned, Abramenko was now placed in charge of the equipment supply depot, this despite the fact that the judge advocate had made it clear that he would not recommend him for any position entailing material responsibility.

Soon thereafter the unit organized a series of camp assemblies out in the training area. Once again, by some impenetrable logic, Abramenko was out in charge of something, this time the mess facility. And once again the inspectors caught him red-handed in some more shady business. It was hoped that this would be the signal to take some really effective steps in this case to call this light-fingered warrant officer to account. But time passed, and the report containing the account of the man's "sins" lay gathering dust. Only two months later, and this after the intervention of superior authorities, did the regimental commander find it possible to deal with Abramenko. He was held materially liable, and that was that. It was for some reason considered unnecessary to bring this case to the court of regimental opinion.

Generally speaking here, some really unusual attitudes toward the people's controllers had emerged on the part of the regimental commander and other communist leaders. Their words would appear to indicate that they recognized the importance and the necessity of their public activities. They could not but see that these people were working for the common good, could not but notice the real benefits that flowed from their unannounced inspections—they helped "tighten up" the situation at the weak spots and bring about some changes in individuals found to be on the negligent side when it came to official responsibilities and protecting public and military property.

Yes, they saw, they realized.... The fact is that some of them began to get the idea that these inspectors were just causing too much unnecessary trouble. They were just cluttering up the place with all their documents and reports. They were always insisting that attention be given to their business and distracting commanders and other responsible officials from things these people thought were

more important. They were beginning more and more frequently simply to wave these "pesky" people's controllers away. The controllers were becoming increasingly aggressive, and they were now being seen no longer as helpful assistants, but rather as hypercritics who were "making people in the organization nervous."

To change and improve things requires that people be bold and courageous and willing to take a stand on principle, that they speak the truth no matter what the circumstances and that they be willing to call things by their right names. But the problem is that when people display a readiness to do this, they are not exactly making some officials happy. These officials then reveal their own unwillingness to make any changes.

Take the case of Lieutenant A. Krasovskiy, for example. He gave the people's controllers no support whatsoever and openly expressed his displeasure with them, frequently even making disapproving and disparaging remarks to them and about them. He began to find ways to put pressure on the most "enthusiastic" among them. He didn't do any of this openly, of course, because it's tough going nowadays for people who try to hush up criticism. But now, aren't there really other, more "subtle" ways?

Guards Warrant Officer N. Samosyuk, a member of a people's control group, has felt this kind of pressure. He was placed in charge of the mess hall, and in that position immediately began to show some initiative — he cleaned the tulle curtains on the windows. But not too competently, because they "shrank." And immediately there was the reaction: "You're going to have to pay for this in full."

And then Guards Warrant Officer A. Drobyazko was advised not to "spoil a personal history" — he's a new Komsomol man here. He was persuaded not to support Guards Major Dorogan: the time is not too far away, he was reminded, when Dorogan will be leaving the Group of Forces, but you are still going to be here, and be here for a long time.

But both warrant officers stood up to this pressure with enviable persistence and adherence to principle. They did not give in to it. If you've been chosen to serve in a people's control group, they figured, then you've got to justify the confidence that has been shown in you. But not just by going through some motions. You've got to make a concrete contribution to the effort to increase combat readiness, tighten military discipline and improve organization and operations overall. You have to take your stand on principle and be able to finish what you start, just like Guards Major Dorogan. Oleg Fedorovich took a particularly dim view of those who showed inefficiency and wastefulness in their use of public property and an even dimmer view of anybody who proved himself dishonest.

Are these people really not worthy of our support? Doesn't their attitude correspond to ideals of efficiency, responsibility and demandingness we hear people making so much of everywhere nowadays? Unfortunately, however, there are individuals within the group in which these inspectors live and work who do not take this view of the contribution they make. They have not supported them, and Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Yegorov, a political officers, and Guards Major V. Yagudin, a member of the party committee, failed to take their side when they needed someone to come to their defense.



Is it not, in fact, for this very reason that a number of the remaining members of the people's control group here have decided not to "rock the boat?" I'm going to start looking out for myself, they say. The first to take this step was the chairman of the group, Guards Captain V. Polosukhin. He reached the point where he was taking only the most perfunctory of approaches to his public obligations. And then after him followed others.... Only Dorogan, Samosyuk and Drobyazko remained true to themselves. And it is true that while they used to bring shortcomings to light and help remedy them without having to take their cases beyond the sphere of their unit, they are now increasingly frequently having to defend their positions and appeal to the political section and superior authorities. And they have turned to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

I arrived at the regiment with the letter from Guards Warrant Officers Samosyuk and Drobyazko not long before a report and election meeting the people's control group was holding. But from the looks of things I would never have guessed that it had made any particular preparations for the occasion. It was being looked upon as something that wasn't really all that important. And then the meeting itself turned into something I hadn't expected at all. As it turned out, there were a lot of people there who wanted to express their views of the people's control group. Officers and warrant officers were there saying that the people's control group was initially doing a good job and making a contribution. Now, though, it has to be criticized for inefficiency, looking through its fingers at cases of unfairness, unscrupulousness and essentially unconscientious performance, failure to give sufficient attention to questions concerning everyday problems and the daily routine, particularly those of the lieutenants, and for neglecting such things as the fact that the enlisted mess is not serving appealing meals and that there aren't enough utensils. And there were other questions about some important matters the people's controllers had failed to deal with.

Failed to deal with... But what would account for this? The inappropriate attitude toward the people's control group displayed by Guards Lieutenant Colonels Krasovskiy and Yegorov, Guards Major Yagudin and other officials had "cooled" the aggressiveness it had formerly demonstrated. It had been a lost cause.

The large number of notes making their way up to the presidium came as a surprise to Guards Captain Polosukhin, who had presented the activity report. Question followed upon question. He found himself unable to respond to them fully—he didn't have the full story on that, he would say. The chairman of the group was sorry, he said, that his deputy was not present at the meeting—he would be able to answer that question. But at that very moment Guards Major Dorogan was getting ready to leave—he had been transferred to another assignment.

Neither Samosyuk nor Drobyazko spoke at the meeting. They just sat there and listened to the others quietly....

They were not chosen to be members of the now reconstituted people's control group. This coming fall Samosyuk, too, is going to be replaced. And as far as Drobyazko is concerned, he had had his fill of the burdensome difficulties associated with membership on the control group. One thing, though, did give the warrant officers some satisfaction: an injustice had not been perpetrated after all—the report on Guards Major Dorogan had been rewritten.

But are we going to see any change in attitudes toward the inspectors within this regiment? We can only hope.

## ARMED FORCES

### PROBLEMS IN QUALITY OF COMBAT TRAINING

#### Disruption for Economic Work

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jun 86 p 2

[Report by Maj O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Combat Training: Reserves for Acceleration": "At a Turning Point"]

[Text] The June 1986 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee once again stressed the need for acceleration and reorganization, which must be carried out universally and earnestly. This requirement fully applies also to army and navy life, including the combat training.

The SAM regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Tsybin is among the outstanding in the Air Defense Forces. It achieved particularly good results last year. "This is because," the formation commander says, "we are actually carrying out the reorganization, and combat training has truly become the main thing in the life of the regiment. This is producing successes in the training, in discipline and in the maintaining of order and organization."

A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent tells about the experience in organizing combat training in the regiment.

#### 1. A New Approach

The news that Lieutenant Colonel A. Atanov, a Communist, would be rendering account for the combat training at a meeting of a party commission in the unit political section came like a bolt out of the blue for many people in the regiment. Why he was one of the outstanding officers and the commander of an excellent battalion.

He himself was extremely surprised when Major S. Ilchenko, secretary of the party commission, informed him of the decision.

"Am I the very worst or something? Or have I been remiss in the combat training?" he asked the secretary with alarm. "I don't believe we have been dropped from the ranks of the excellent."

"Are people not summoned to the party commission for other reasons, Anatoliy Ivanovich?" the secretary replied.

The problem was that when staff members had visited the site, they had discovered that people were frequently being taken away from classes in the battalion. Specifically, transport and loading vehicle drivers and diesel engine specialists were frequently absent from exercises requiring the full combat crews. In another incident, the battery commanded by Captain V. Akinchikov was assigned a detail, and the remaining several men were left to their own devices. Classes could and should have been arranged for them.... And all of this was in an excellent subunit.

Lieutenant Colonel Atanov did not expect such a stern talk to be conducted with him, the commander of an excellent battalion. Why deny the fact: at first he took offense at the criticism. After thinking it over, however, he understood that the reproaches were justified. When he returned to the battalion, he assembled the officers and sternly demanded that in the future every last soldier be present for the classes.

The fact that the commander of an excellent battalion had been called to the party commission had extensive repercussions in the regiment. It forced the other subunit commanders also to alter their approach to the organization of the combat training in many ways.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Tsybin, regimental commander, set the tone for the increased demandingness of the combat training. It began, perhaps, at the party meeting held soon after the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The essence of the discussion prompted by Communist Tsybin could be summarized this way. Yes, we have been among the outstanding for many years now. But is everything outstanding in the outstanding regiment? Specifically, the organization of the combat training? This is our main job, after all, and it is sometimes relegated to a secondary position. People are frequently taken away from the training and assigned to various administrative tasks, or else classes are postponed or changed without any particular necessity. All of this negatively affects the training of the personnel and--and this is also very important--reduces the enthusiasm of the men and weakens discipline and organization. We need to readjust our attitude toward the combat training. The party organization supported the commander's determined position and persistently implemented that line.

Soon after that meeting, at the regimental commander's order, a group of officers from the unit directorate thoroughly studied the situation in the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Atanov. Communist Atanov presented his report at the meeting of the party commission afterward.

This was only the first step, however. The removal of personnel from classes began to occur less frequently, but many people believed that this heightened demandingness was just a temporary campaign. It would pass, and everything would be the same again. This attitude had to be eliminated, and the fact that there was nothing more important in the life of the unit than the combat training had to be persistently instilled in the minds of the personnel, particularly the officers.



This was the way the commander and his deputies felt. But how was it achieved?

"Frankly, it was not easy," Lieutenant Colonel Tsybin says. "There was no other way, however: today, as never before, it is important to have a sense of the spirit of the times, of the pace of acceleration which is being established in the nation and in the Armed Forces. And not just to have a sense of it, but to live and work at that pace oneself. Combat training is our production, figuratively speaking. Imagine stopping the main assembly line at a plant and sending the workers out to police the area. Absurd? Absolutely. But this is possible with us. It is not considered wrong to remove a soldier from a class to police the grounds or even an entire platoon to perform details."

Yes, combat training is of course the main thing for every subunit and every unit. Speaking with the regimental commander, his deputies and other individuals in charge, and thinking about the steps taken and the efforts made in the unit to put the combat training in order, I caught myself thinking more than once: Against whom should the struggle actually be waged? The subunit commanders? But they are the first to be interested in having their subordinates engage only in combat training. Nonetheless, it is most frequently the subunit commanders who take the personnel away from classes. "We are forced to," is an explanation which I have heard more than once. The real reason is the fact that over the years the idea has become established in the minds of the officers that they can remove personnel from the training with impunity. And then suddenly there are different demands, a different approach. A psychological readjustment is needed in order to accept them. And it is an extremely difficult thing to alter the psychology of people.

"We had to issue a special order," the regimental commander said.

Under that order, not a single soldier can be taken away from his classes without the personal permission of the battalion commander. And a class can only be re-scheduled or changed with the permission of the regimental chief of staff. It is not difficult to imagine that far from every officer would request of the battalion that "a couple of men be left" to work in the barracks. Nor would they go to the regimental chief of staff unless there was an urgent need....

What could be more simple: issue this order, and the problem is solved. No one will postpone classes. No one will remove a platoon or a section from a training session to perform details. Life is life, however, and despite the great autonomy of the SAM regiment it is linked with the "outside world" in many ways. Situations which could not be foreseen frequently arise in the regiment. An unscheduled carload of coal arrives in the regiment, for example: personnel have to be taken away from their classes. Many such unforeseen situations arise. What is to be done?

Every commander obviously has to resolve this matter. Many commander's qualities such as demandingness and the ability to find a reasonable solution in an atypical situation are tested as though with a touchstone.

A great deal has been achieved in this regiment. Among other things, the number of "unforeseen situations" within the regiment has been reduced to a minimum by improving the planning. If some service chief has not made provisions for something to be done in his area, he cannot count on resolving the problem with an

"all-hands-on-deck" effort, by "soliciting" men from a subunit. The battalion and battery commanders themselves also have numerous needs of their own, however, for which men were previously taken away from their classes without hesitation. This was not eliminated at once (it has not been totally eliminated even today). Some people had to be punished, some brought to accountability. The situation has improved markedly.

Many of the problems having to do with removing personnel for so-called "objective" reasons are superficial problems, as they say. It is therefore easier to deal with them. The "covert" separation of personnel from classes is equally harmful to the training, however. The causes are sometimes most unexpected.

"This is what I recently encountered," the chief of the unit political section said. "I visited Lieutenant Yu. Chechel's class. It was being conducted by a sergeant. I asked where the team chief was. The sergeant said that he had been summoned to headquarters for a briefing.

A battery commander was absent from another battalion that same day. He had gone to the depot for clothing supplies.

There you have it. They fought for every minute of training time, while wasting hours and days. And where was this occurring? Right around them: at headquarters, at the clothing supply depot.... It seems that any service chief could summon an officer from the site at any time, take him away from his classes without formality. Dropping everything, the officer would rush to headquarters in order... to sign a report. It was calculated that around 100 man-days were used annually in the regiment....

It was necessary to overcome a harmful work style which had developed over the years. The party organization of the regimental directorate helped the commander a great deal. Discussion of the directorate officers' work style at party meetings, the rendering of account by Communists at the bureau and other forms of party pressure actively contributed to the restructuring of the work.

It is difficult to reassess values. Even at regimental headquarters certain officers--Major V. Grigoryev and Captain V. Gavrilin, for example--paid lip service to the restructuring but had not backed up this position with action. With this in mind, the regimental commander, the political section and the party organization are striving to explain to the men in a planned and consistent manner the purport of the restructuring and the need to work in the new manner.

Fulfillment of the demand that we focus on the combat training entailed changes also in other areas of regimental life. Take the matter of providing officers and warrant officers with clothing supplies. "Why not have workers with the clothing supply service deliver everything required to the sites," Lieutenant Colonel Tsybin once suggested. They tried this. It could not have turned out better. The people were satisfied, and training time was saved. The experiment was then extended to other regimental services--taking the specific work performed by each into account, of course. The main requirement that all of the services should serve the interests of the combat training was given concrete embodiment.

"In addition to the combat and political training plan, we also have plans for the performance of construction work with our own means and for other secondary jobs," the regimental commander says. "We try to accomplish them without detriment to the training, with careful planning and precise organization, but we do not always succeed...."

I feel that this too is not of secondary importance but a matter requiring clarity and definitiveness if we want combat training truly to be the most important thing in the life of the military unit.

The problem of having absolutely all of the personnel involved in the training has basically been resolved in the regiment today. This does not mean, however, that all of the problems involved in improving the quality of the combat training have been solved. One thing is clear even now, though. The new approach and the more principled and critical view of it have permitted the missilemen to reveal numerous other bottlenecks. But this will be discussed separately.

#### Excess Paperwork

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 86 p 1

[Report by Maj O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Combat Training: Reserves for Acceleration": "At a Turning Point"]

[Text] 2. In the Struggle for Quality

As they resolve the problem of involving all of the personnel in combat training as a priority task, the regimental commander, the staff, the political section and the unit methods council consider this task not in isolation but as an integral part of the group of factors involved in accelerating the combat training. The officers' methodological skill is one of them.

It would be an oversimplification, even incorrect, to say that the methodological preparation of the instructors was previously poor, that everything began to improve radically when demandingness was increased with respect to the combat training. It is more complex than that. The regiment has held the title of an excellent regiment for many years in a row, after all. It has invariably performed well in all tactical exercises involving live firing in recent years. There is thus no basis for speaking of any sort of failures in the past. It is a matter of achieving qualitatively new levels in methods.

When officers from the unit directorate visit the sites for comprehensive inspections, they are unvaryingly instructed to spot even bits and pieces of progressive know-how in the methods. At the same time, they are not to overlook any deficiencies, any methodological errors by the instructors, no matter how petty or isolated they might appear. The officers submit their observations to the methods council, which summarizes and analyzes the information.

The following fact drew their attention, for example. In the subunit commanded by Officer N. Anisimov the conditions for the exercises and drills were no better than in the others. The specialists, however, and particularly the operators and

the members of the launching crews settled into their jobs and mastered related specialties more rapidly. What was the reason? It was previously believed that this was due to the solid methodological know-how of Anisimov, one of the unit's best methods experts. Life demanded a more thorough study of the reasons.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kuznetsov, deputy regimental commander for armaments, visited the site. He studied the combat training in the battalion and took a close look at the organization of the exercises and the competition. The good professional and methodological skill of the commander and the other officers unquestionably had a large role in the rapid development of the specialists there. Also important, however, was the skilful and inventive employment of the method of phased development of skills in the specialists, a method forgotten in some places. This method calls for the young specialists immediately to be made members of the crews so that they perform their functional duties the same as all the others. Some people were disturbed by the fact that the new men sometimes became rattled and could not grasp the essence or the purpose of the operations. For that very reason certain commanders rejected a method which had justified itself on the practical level.

Anisimov made certain changes in the method in the subunit. In addition, he was especially thorough with the professional selection of specialists, using special tests, questionnaires and problem-solving for this purpose. This subsequently made their training easier and enabled them to fit into the crews more rapidly and be trained up to the level of rated specialists. Skilfully organized competition and rivalry in the classes helped. A note was made of all this, as they say, and Officer Anisimov was charged with conducting demonstration classes with his subunit.

Many valuable things were also spotted in the methods used for organizing and conducting classes and drills by officers I. Bukata, Ye. Padalkin, V. Zabolotskikh and others. Everything valuable and progressive was systematized, and the work performed by the staff officers to gather and process progressive know-how was described in a special log. Shortcomings and errors were also noted there.

During a training session in the battery commanded by Major N. Dubrov, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Melnik noticed that there was a comparatively small number of training stations. As a result, some specialists would work with the equipment while others would await their turn. Methodological errors were also detected in other classes. Furthermore, some of them were repeated in many different subunits.

The idea of conducting a model methods week in the regiment was born at that time. It was suggested at one of the regimental commander's service conferences by Major N. Mikhaylov, chairman of the unit methods council. Other officers also expressed their observations and thoughts. The model week involved conducting the same activities in all of the subunits with a schedule of classes and drills compiled in advance, the servicing of the equipment and a park maintenance day, beginning and ending at the same time. Monitoring preparation of the instructors by the regimental staff officers and providing them with methodological assistance was an important element.

During the critique at the end of the week each officer, warrant officer and junior commander was given an evaluation and specific recommendations. Among other



things, the young officers were advised to study the functional duties of their subordinates more thoroughly in order to take their level of preparedness and the capabilities of the radioelectronic equipment into account for directing the combat work. For this purpose it was deemed expedient to conduct practical drills for the officer teams, in which the officers themselves would perform the duties of the NCOs and lower ranks.

The common model week "brought adjustments" also in the methods used for employing the efficient technical maintenance system (RASTO). The system conserves time, equipment life, fuel and lubricants. The campaign for conservation, however, an analysis showed, had been detrimental to the combat readiness of the equipment. Essential operations were sometimes eliminated from the periodic technical servicing. This had indirectly affected also the combat preparation of new soldiers, who had fewer opportunities to learn how to skilfully service the equipment from the veteran specialists and consequently, to study the complex equipment. In short, corrections had to be made....

These model weeks are now a common thing in the regiment. When I think about that first week, it seems to me that its special value probably lay not so much in the additional methodological skill gained by the instructors, although it would be difficult to overstate the value of this. The main thing was that it had very important psychological effects, if I may call them that. Indeed, when everyone in the subunits--from the soldier to the battalion commander--saw all of the officers from the regimental directorate studying the organization of the training in the crews, sections and batteries, and striving to see that it was organized in an exemplary manner, all of this had its effect. The personnel became convinced that when the combat training is regarded as paramount, the results increase markedly, organization and discipline improve, and the entire rhythm of life becomes more precise. The week seemed to consolidate that turning point which had taken shape with respect to regarding the combat training as the main thing in the life of the unit.

The practical focus of the training, its orientation toward a good end result--preparedness to engage in battle with an actual enemy and achieve victory--constitutes an extremely important aspect of the multifaceted concept of combat training quality. Everything is important here: how the standards are met, the tactical setting in the exercises, the conditions under which the missions are performed.... In other words, it is essential for every exercise to be conducted with the intensity of combat, in a situation approaching combat to the maximum possible degree. The regimental commander sets the example in the fight against various kinds of conditionalities and simplifications, as he does in everything else.

Lieutenant Colonel Tsybin once came to a training session in the subunit commanded by Major M. Makarov. The fightingmen met the standards for preparing the training missile for launching, rapidly and without particularly straining themselves. One should have been happy, but Lieutenant Colonel Tsybin was not.

"Prepare another missile," he ordered.

The situation introduced by the regimental commander, which made the mission considerably more complicated, markedly altered the course of the exercise. The

fightingmen drastically reduced the pace of their combat work and met the norm for a good evaluation with difficulty. Both psychological tension and the fact that many operations involved in connecting the assemblies had not been "polished up" made themselves felt. Can one boast of this kind of excellent evaluation, achieved under simplified conditions?

At first, the formation staff took a dim view of such introduced problems, and the regimental commander listened to criticism. He justified them, however: Who needs bogus "fives? Whom are we fooling? And they came to agree with him.

It is wisely said that he who seeks shall find. And he sometimes finds it there where it would appear that all reserves have been exhausted. The following incident is noteworthy. After attending some exercises in one of the battalions, Tsybin assembled the officers and said:

"The battalion's position does not entirely measure up to the contemporary demands."

The unit commander had a reason for bringing this up. In the final analysis, the combat training is supposed to enhance combat readiness. This is precisely what prompted him to seek a more effective combat position for the battalion, taking the contemporary demands into account.

I was told in the regiment that certain comrades did not at first see the connection between the commander's demand that the position be altered and the acceleration and restructuring of the combat training. Some of them also wondered why they should seek extra work for themselves. The battalion had occupied its position for years, and as many inspectors as there had been, none of them had expressed any complaints. And since it was not demanded from above, did they really need to bring it on themselves?...

Yes, they did! When Tsybin heard about this kind of talk, he summoned the chief of the political section:

"Anatoliy Alekseyevich, let us think about how we can get every officer and warrant officer, every NCO and lower-ranking soldier to understand that the acceleration and the restructuring must begin with each of us, that there is no point in waiting for prompting 'from above'...."

Before departing the regiment, I asked the commander the traditional question about plans.

"I see the immediate task as one of making the summer training period a turning point in the attitude toward the combat training," Viktor Vasilyevich replied.

And one has confidence that this will be achieved.

From the editor: We do not consider that this subject has been exhausted with the publication of our correspondent's commentary on certain aspects of the acceleration of combat training in the excellent SAM regiment. And we are prepared to give you, comrade readers, an opportunity to tell about your experience



in the work, about how the combat training is being improved in your unit, on your ship, in your subunit, and how the struggle to accelerate it and improve the quality is being waged.

### Oversimplification of Exercises

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Col T. Nurgaliyev, Military Pilot First Class and a deputy department chief at district air force headquarters, Lt Col R. Khazbiyev, an instructor in the political section of the district air forces, and Maj V. Usoltsev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Central Asian Military District, under the rubric "Training Time Is for Training": "A Long Time to Warm Up: An Unannounced Inspection by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] Air regiment "X" is one of the best in the district air forces. It has long had a good rule that all flights are performed and serviced with only good or excellent ratings, even though the performance of the scheduled flight shifts has become extremely difficult for a number of objective reasons. Many of the crews frequently have to perform missions away from their airfield and to spend weeks away on missions. Despite this, well conceived and skilfully organized combat training has produced a marked improvement in the airmen's combat skill during the winter period. Lieutenant Colonel V. Krichkovskiy and Major V. Nedyuzhiy, military pilots first class, and many others were among those setting the tone in the training and the socialist competition.

How effectively is the training time utilized there today? According to the schedule of activities displayed at unit headquarters, today was to be a day of commander's training in the 1st and 2nd squadrons, a day of preliminary preparations for the next day's flights in the 3rd.

When asked where the personnel were, Major S. Pyslar, chief of staff of the 2nd squadron, replied:

"The pilots and navigators are filling out flight documents, the technicians are at the airfield, and the warrant officers are at the club, listening to a scheduled political training lecture. The enlisted men have political classes."

In short, none of the airmen were idle, but only the warrant officers, NCOs and first-term soldiers were involved in scheduled training that day.

"There is no one to conduct classes for," Captain A. Kiriyyenko, a deputy squadron commander, complained. "Many of the crews are away on temporary assignments."

Many of the pilots and navigators were in fact performing various flight missions away from their airfield. The technicians were still there, however, as were some of the flight crews. Scheduled classes could very well have been conducted for them.

"How do you plan to make up the lost time?" one of us asked.

"We shall conduct extra classes during hours when no flights are scheduled and look for other possibilities," Major Pyslar replied.

One could not help wondering why training time should be wasted that day, only to look for ways later to make up for it. Would it not be better to use available possibilities for further improving the professional skill of the personnel?

There were also doubts about whether the officer's assurances were realistic. This is why. A formal approach to the organization of the officers' training was perceptible in that squadron. For example, the classes and drills which should already have been conducted according to the schedule were not entered in the log. One might have thought that the personnel in charge had simply forgotten to do this because of their heavy work load. They forgot to explain, however, the fact that the same tactical subject, a specific subject just for helicopter pilots, had been scheduled for both the plane and helicopter pilots. And that the squadron schedule was an exact copy of the regimental schedule according to which the directorate officers trained. Even the names of those who would present the lectures and conduct the seminars were the same. The regimental commander was surprised when he saw his name on the list of instructors for the 2nd squadron. He was supposed to be testing his deputies and other staff officers at that time.

Unfortunately, shortcomings were also detected in the organization and the conduct of scheduled classes in other subunits in the regiment as well. Furthermore, far from all of the servicemen who were not flying or on detail attended them.

Failure to properly monitor the quality of the classes and training sessions and the regimental staff officers' precise adherence to the daily schedule was one of the causes of the aforementioned shortcomings.

"What can we do?" Lieutenant Colonel G. Rabyshchuk, who was accompanying us, answered the question with a question. "We implement or study up to 20 different documents arriving in the regiment from higher headquarters every day, documents which frequently duplicate one another. We are thus forced to busy ourselves with 'paperwork'."

Once again we could see that despite the demand that the quantity of paperwork coming from above be reduced, the units continue to be swept by a storm of official papers, using up a lot of time and energy on the part of commanders and political workers.

Another air unit which we visited is also not listed among the laggards. The personnel are ordinarily not separated from their base. In short, there is every opportunity to precisely organize and conduct the classes.

There was no class schedule at the unit headquarters, however. Nor was a single one of the officers in charge there. I thought to myself: "They are probably all with the personnel at the training sites." Warrant Officer O. Lodinov, assistant regimental duty officer, however, reported that the commander had left for the KECh [billeting unit], and his deputy for political affairs was also away on some business.

Personnel in the subunit commanded by Major A. Krasilnyy were training at three locations. Some of them were at the athletic field; others were in a class; and yet others were at the vehicle pool. The first thing which struck one at the athletic field was the low level of discipline in the exercises. The soldiers were sitting on a bench, and Warrant Officer Ye. Khavrel, the instructor, would call them to the [parallel] bars one at a time. A group of warrant officers were standing off to the side.

"Why are they not in class"?

"They have been performing a special assignment," Major Krasilnyy said. He did not explain, however, what sort of assignment it was that gives a serviceman the right to attend a class as a sideline observer.

You will agree that such a class is of little benefit. At best, each soldier was able to get up to the apparatus only five or six times during the 2 hours. I believe that this was due in part also to the fact that the class was conducted by someone other than the individual indicated in the schedule. Incidentally, the special training classes also were conducted by Warrant Officer S. Charlin instead of Senior Lieutenant Yu. Galindukhin and Lieutenant A. Shuvalov.

"Senior Lieutenant Galindukhin is servicing the equipment right now, and Lieutenant Shuvalov has a pass," is how the subunit commander explained the replacement of instructors.

Warrant Officer Charlin did not learn that he would have to conduct the class with the soldiers until the personnel were being sent to their training stations. Naturally, even though he is a specialist first class, he was unable to properly prepare. Several diagrams were displayed in the classroom, but not for the subject to be studied. This meant that the training process was not reinforced with the necessary visual aids. Consequently, the time allocated for the training was not utilized efficiently.

The CPSU Central Committee's Appeal to Workers of the Soviet Union stresses the fact that when the competition is organized, its first commandment--work time is for work--must be absolutely observed. In our situation, it means that the training time is for training. The above shortcomings in the organization and the conduct of the training show that the process of working out the kinks has been dragged out at the beginning of the summer training period for the airmen in certain district units. We must take the most vigorous steps to see that every minute of training time is used with maximum effectiveness, that every case of the personnel's removal from classes is regarded as a serious occurrence.

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ARMED FORCES

PROBLEMS WITH INTRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION OF INNOVATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank A. Tkachev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Losses From Formalism or, What is Hampering the Military Innovators"]

[Text] The merits of the equipment are revealed most fully in the combat training. Weak points are sometimes also detected, however. This is only natural. Something else is not natural. "One of the assemblies turned out to be subject to cracking," Major Yu. Raguzin wrote to the editor. "It was not supposed to be repaired but to be replaced with a new unit. It was convenient to replace it and not bother with repairs. Some people did feel bad about scrapping the defective assembly and along with it, thousands of rubles of the people's money. It was all covered in the instructions, however, and was therefore justified. The procedure thus suited those who do not like problems."

It did not suit the military innovators, who rightly viewed increasing the reliability of the ill-fated assembly as a means of enhancing combat readiness and a considerable reserve for conserving state funds. There were many attempts to develop a device to effectively prevent the cracking, and an engineer solution to the problem was found in the unit in which Officer Yu. Rukin is chairman of the commission on inventions. Major Yu. Raguzin, who deserves the main credit for untying the "knot of unreliability," spent 2 years building an operating model.

In 1982 the device was displayed at an exhibition of scientific and technical creative work and was rated highly by the specialists. The senior chiefs shook Major Raguzin's hand and sincerely thanked him for developing the needed device....

A year later the model was again displayed at an exhibition of scientific and tech.... From this point one can reread the previous paragraph. The whole thing was repeated in 1984 and 1985. And according to the most modest calculations, the use of the innovation would have resulted in a saving of many thousands of rubles. Nothing changed, however. The letter goes on to say that quite by accident a representative of the organization which is directly involved in the development of this kind of equipment turned up in the unit. He accidentally heard about what the innovators had made. Things then went as they should have gone from the very beginning. The model was sent at once to a scientific research institute and recommended for series production. Major Raguzin was issued an inventor's certificate for it.



We shall return to the letter from Yuriy Aleksandrovich. Right now, however, it should be stated that the readers' response to Major V. Khoronenko's comments on the problems of technical creativity under the title "Crossed Out in the 'Introduction' Column" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 May) was not long in coming. There were also telephone calls from the districts and groups of forces. People of various professions and ranks were unanimous about one thing: extremely necessary devices developed by the military innovators, devices capable of producing a considerable economic effect, enhancing the reliability and the combat capabilities of the equipment, and improving their servicing and repair can sometimes not get a start in life. Dozens and hundreds of devices are produced in single copies, drift from one exhibition or display to another and are entered in the records. "An exhibit specimen does not solve problems, however. The congratulations and certificates must be followed up with active support.... There must be a most decisive restructuring," the newspaper's readers unanimously believe. "Enough of just making a show of rationalization work in the forces."

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kolennikov believes that the multiple reproduction of many developments is frequently stalled by lack of access to the necessary materials, which go to waste in warehouses and are written off when their storage life expires. "In our SAM regiment as well," the officer writes, "valuable innovations developed by Majors S. Alekseyev and L. Berezhnnyy and by Senior Lieutenant I. Sukhodolskiy, rationalizers, could not be adopted in all of the subunits. Radio parts and expendable materials were lacking. At the same time, all of this is collecting dust on shelves at a depot for material support of combat training for the group of forces, which I visited. The people in charge had this to say: "How will you account for the materials if we sign them out to you? No one will sign a statement of expenditure for rationalization work. If the materials were going for combat training, there would be no problems!"

As you can see, there are problems. If one takes the viewpoint of those who only pay lip service to creative activeness, the combat training exists in and of itself, the rationalization work in and of itself, and there is an abyss separating them. It is an absurd situation. Invention and rationalization work in the forces is supposed to enhance the combat readiness, after all.

A simulator for manual trackers of air targets was not introduced for more than a year because of a "shortage" of the necessary microcircuits. It would have saved engine life and fuel and would have doubled the effectiveness of the training. Senior Lieutenant S. Aleksandrov, who created the device, finally lost his patience, one of the letters reports. He bought the parts with his own money to get the needed simulator into use in the subunit. The act evokes respect for the officer, but it also illustrates just how illogical the situation is.

Because of poor dissimination of information among analogous units, the "wheel" is invented over and over again.... A dolly for installing suspended aircraft weapons, which had been improved by Majors G. Inin and V. Ivashinenko and Captain V. Vasilchenko, was displayed at an exhibition of the creations of rationalizers and inventors of the Air Forces. The device quadruples the speed at which the job is performed, frees several people, reduces the physical load on the armament specialists and protects the ammunition from accidental damage. After the passage of two and a half years, Captain M. Syrtlanov writes from the Transcaucasus Military District, the dolly continues to be used in the air unit in which it was

developed, while rationalizers in other units struggle to build similar, frequently inferior, devices. And all because the commission on inventions from higher headquarters simply "forgot" to distribute the blueprints for the dolly among the air units.

Letters from Captain 3rd Rank A. Alekseyev and Senior Lieutenant V. Lavrenyuk bring up the problems of multiple reproduction of the innovators' developments (a theme which runs through almost all of the mail), the work style of the commissions on inventions in the units and on the ships (formalism, preoccupation with reports and neglect of the essential work), their relations with district and fleet levels (lack of efficiency, real assistance or interest in ideas), lack of publicity in the units themselves and of daily concern for the needs of the rationalizers on the part of commanders.

Lieutenant Col. L. Kernoga points out deficiencies of documents governing payment for rationalization developments, imprecise terminology in the instructions on rationalization work in the forces, and their nonconformity to the spirit of the times.

The editor's mailbag has contained many other examples of the interest evoked in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers by the newspaper's stinging article. They mention other problems especially disturbing today, at the restructuring stage. Unfortunately, the editor's mailbag does not yet provide a tangible basis for stating that a determined battle is being waged against formalism or that a vigorous effort has been launched to improve entrenched methods of management, the encouragement of technical creativity locally or its efficiency.

In connection with this, it could not be more appropriate to turn to decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress, which directly state the following: "Encourage scientific and technical creativity.... Create the conditions necessary for adopting inventions and rationalization proposals as rapidly as possible...."

What additional instructions are needed?

This is from a letter from Major Yu. Raguzin: "Lieutenant Colonel A. Prygunov is working in a very concrete way with the rationalizers in our unit.... He has evicted them from premises set up as a rationalization and inventions room. He ordered all of the equipment collected over the years to be removed to the basement, where it has been ruined. The room has been practically empty for a year now, while the rationalizers have nowhere to work. Why is such a thing happening? Because no one actually bears specific responsibility for the status of rationalization work"....

We can say frankly that this is a sad case. This sort of thing does not encourage the innovators or help to stimulate technical creativity. On the contrary, it produces material and moral damage and is contrary to the spirit of the times.

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ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

CONFERENCE ON PRE-DRAFT TRAINING--A conference of representatives of party and soviet organs, institutions and local agencies of military administration of oblasts and autonomous republics in the Ural zone was held in Sverdlovsk. It dealt with questions of preparing the youth to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Reports were presented by Colonel General Yu. Naumenko, Deputy Commander in Chief of Ground Forces for Outside Military Training and Chief of Outside Military Training of the Ministry of Defense, and Colonel General N. Grachev, Commander of the Ural Military District. A. Moskvitin, Minister of Education of the Komi ASSR, K. Kirillov, Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast DOSAAF Committee, A. Pervukhin, Chief of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration of Technical Production Education, and others took part in the discussion of the report. This was followed by a scientific and practical conference on the improvement of military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and preparation of the youth to serve in the army and navy. The report presented by Lieutenant General O. Zinchenko, member of the district Military Council and chief of the district Political Directorate, and presentations by the participants developed recommendations for improving preparation for the service and approved a comprehensive, joint plan for working with the pre-draft youth. [by Colonel A. Vlahno] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 86 p 2] 11499

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## AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### TWO-DAY TRANSPORT FLIGHT TAKES TEN DAYS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Col I. Kapayev, senior inspector for flight safety, and Col A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Problem Demands a Solution": "Barriers Erected on the Route of a Military Transport Aircraft by the Lack of Interdepartmental Coordination"]

[Text] Upon hearing of our wish to fly the Moscow-Far East-Kamchatka route with the crew of an An-26 military transport, Major General of Aviation V. Baranov, chief of the Political Section of the Military Transport Aviation, asked:

"How many days do you expect to spend on the flight"?

Calculating that a civilian Il-62 airliner would cover the nine time zones in about the same number of hours, I calculated the speed of our aircraft and answered:

"Two days."

"How about a month"?

Now it was time for us to be surprised. After all, it had taken A.P. Chekhov only slightly more time than that to reach Sakhalin in 1890. But the writer had crossed the expanses of Siberia, in his own words, "by horse and steed."

"You can cover the route in 2 days if you take the special flight or if people at the intermediate airfields are informed in advance about who is on board," the general said with a smile.

Both suggestions were rejected, since the authors of the article had taken on the task of personally verifying the reality of the difficulties about which pilots with the military transport aviation have written to the editor more than once.

The crew of our military transport was no different from dozens of others which fly the expanses of the Fifth Ocean over the homeland every day. Captain V. Morozov, military pilot 1st class and aircraft commander, is certified to fly

day or night in even the most difficult weather conditions. Senior Lieutenant A. Yatsenko, his co-pilot, is completely in love with his profession. Captain D. Khamitov, specialist 1st class and flight technician, knows his job very well. Warrant Officer V. Vostretsov, who has a master's rating and is the senior aircraft mechanic, sees to it that things are in order in the freight compartment and that the fuel and oil are replenished. Captain V. Tarakanov, aircraft radio operator, ensures that there is uninterrupted communication. The airmen refer to Major V. Melenchuk, aircraft navigator, with great respect as the "guardian of flight conditions." The overall description of the crew: capable of performing the most difficult assignment in isolation from the sub-unit.

...They were unable to take off at the scheduled time. This was the second day the crew had delayed the flight notification. They were waiting for Warrant Officer A. Shkolnikov, who, at Major General Yu. Zvarich's orders, was to deliver to the aircraft part of the cargo for the Far-Easterners.

On the third day, unable to wait for the warrant officer, who had mysteriously disappeared, the crew received the "go-ahead" for the flight. The permission was 2 hours late, however.

After 5 hours of flying, the air route took us to an intermediate landing field. Upon landing, the crew immediately set about preparing the An-26 for the next stage of the route. This did not take long. Colonel V. Sharkov, the senior air chief there, had allocated the necessary supplies in advance.

Captain Morozov came out of the small building housing the air-traffic control service:

"We will not be received any further. Lieutenant Colonel Blagodarov, operations duty officer for Siberian Military District Air Forces, claims that there is no notification.

"We will have to put the crew up in a barracks," we were warned by Warrant Officer M. Tkachev, duty air-traffic controller.

We tried to find out the real reasons why the crew was not being accepted in the Siberian Military District. Once again, Captain Morozov got busy on the telephone. He gave his call sign and the number of the request, and he finally heard a disgruntled voice say: "There is no available parking space"! This was immediately followed by some short whistling sounds.

The air traffic controller, who had observed the scene, said:

"You are from another department, not a part of the command element of the district air forces....."

Here it was, another barrier: the differentiation between "ours" and "theirs" which is especially frequently discussed in letters to the editor. Can it not be overcome, then?

The pertinent document states the following: "The only reasons for refusing to accept an aircraft are weather conditions which do not permit the aircraft to be accepted, an airfield which has been put out of operation...."

Weather conditions that day were fairly mild, and the distant airfield was handling its normal load. It was clear that the barrier had been raised on the crew's route by departmental bureaucracy. And so, we began "working our way through." After 2 hours and 15 minutes of telephone calls to officials in various departments, Lieutenant Colonel A. Nogovitsin, an officer with the Air Defense Forces, made the decision to receive the crew. It was done, unfortunately, because... someone knew someone.

It was learned that Major V. Kazantsev, commander of the air subunit, had not informed Lieutenant Colonel Nogovitsin that the request had been received. An officer with the Unified Air Traffic Control System (Yes UVD), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Altynov, had also known about the request to fly through and about the route of the An-26 since that morning, but had taken no action on it..

Late that night Captain Morozov taxied the aircraft onto a parking area of the subunit commanded by Major V. Kazantsev. Incidentally, this officer was from the same department as the crew which had flown in. He too had done nothing to receive and provide for "his own" in good time, however.

Combining lunch and dinner, we settled down in the city hotel. We did not get a chance to rest, however. Two hours later, Captain Morozov and the crew were summoned to the airfield. The An-26 was once again in someone's way, and the engines had to be started up in order to taxi the aircraft a hundred meters away.

It was the fourth day of the flight, but it was still a very long distance to the destination.

Obtaining the next take-off clearance, Morozov counted on landing that day at one of the airfields in the Transbaykal Military District. However, Major Adonin (like many others, he did not tell us his name), the operations duty officer for the Unified Air Traffic Control System, reported that the commander of district air forces was conducting a critique of exercises that day and had ordered that "no one be accepted at the airfield." And especially an aircraft from another department. The squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Volkov of the same department as Captain Morozov is based there, however. Volkov too refused to receive the crew, however, claiming that the personnel were busy correcting shortcomings detected by a commission from higher headquarters.

The commander of an ordinary military transport aircraft could not overcome such barriers as these, of course.

I could see and feel the fatigue produced in the pilots by the mental and nervous tension artificially created by commanders and chiefs who, at that very time, were possibly making fine-sounding statements somewhere about longevity in flight work and about flight safety.

Senior Lieutenant Yatsenko rushed in: "Comrade Commander, we have a place to stay. I talked the hotel manager into it...."

The next morning we were told that they were prepared to accept us in the Transbaykal Military District. The crew hurriedly ate what was left of yesterday's rolls from the snack bar and rushed to the aircraft.

Major V. Tupitsyn, who met the aircraft at the landing field, announced:

"We can't refuel you: there is no fuel...."

We saw that this was not true when we went to the motor-vehicle pool and saw a refueling truck filled to the brim.

The crew did not succeed in taking off that day. There where military districts--Siberian, Transbaykal and Far East--met, we encountered an obstacle which could only be overcome with help from Moscow.

After the crew had prepared the An-26 for take off, Captain Biktenbayev (he did not give his name) of the Far East Military Air Forces told Captain Morozov: "your [flight] notification has been lost."

When, at last, Captain Morozov learned by telephone that Major V. Vlasov had received our request, Number 502, and ... lost it, he frankly admitted:

"There's nothing more I can do. We will have to spend the night here...."

No, the aircraft commander was not making too much of his being helpless. He was looking at the situation realistically. To the officers in the air forces of the districts, our crew was an "ordinary" one, and it could therefore "cool its heels" a week or so at an intermediate airfield. The duties of the men under Colonels V. Karetnikov and A. Karmyanskiy of the Unified Air Traffic Control System, it turns out, simply do not include such matters as expediting flights along the route. Their most important job is to prevent infractions of flight conditions.

Nor was Captain Morozov able to obtain a flight clearance for the next morning. We were told from the Far East Military Air Forces: "no fuel for refueling," "no parking space," and then once again, "the notification did not come through."

It was at this point we decided to report to Moscow that officials of the Far East Military District Air Forces were not doing their job. Everything changed immediately. Captain Morozov was no longer the one in a hurry: people were now rushing him to take off. Lieutenant Colonel Volkov apologized for the negligence of his men. Special equipment--a refueling truck and a machine for starting the engines--were already waiting on the bank of the Amur where we landed. In just 1 hour (!) the crew took off again.

It was the seventh day of the flight, but more than 2,000 kilometers remained to the destination. We had to land once before covering that distance, however. For the first time on the flight, weather put up a barrier on the route of the An-26.



The crew landed at an airfield of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Captain Morozov was forced to resort to bartering in order to get the plane refueled. We shall not say exactly what he exchanged for several tons of fuel, but we repeat: He was forced to do this, since he encountered a situation which is absolutely not covered in the documents.

There was no room at the city hotel. Spending the night in the aircraft with a temperature of minus 20 degrees on board the plane was unthinkable. To whom could we turn?

Formerly, the commandant's office at each airfield handled the housing of transient crews. They were abolished, however, and nothing new has been thought up to replace them. The crew spent the night... at the hospital, where Colonel V. Nikitin is in charge. Next morning, we decided to thank Colonel G. Orekhov, the garrison chief, for his "hospitality," only to learn that he did in fact have premises designated for use as a hotel. However....

We were in the air again. We thought about how airmen who get hot borshch once a week must be of extraordinarily strong health in order to work under this kind of pressure.

The crew arrived at the destination at the end of the ninth day. When the propellers of the An-26 had stopped, Captain Morozov came to us and said:

"For the entire crew, I thank you for your help, comrades. Otherwise, we would have flown twice as long...."

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## AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### NIGHT-TIME FIGHTER TACTICS AGAINST AA POSITION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZEVZDA in Russian 14 Jun 86 p 1

[Article by Maj B. Kononenko, military pilot 2nd class, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Over a Mountain Canyon"]

[Text] The motorized riflemen were absolutely unable to break the "enemy's" resistance in the exercise, since fresh reserves kept coming in from somewhere. The airmen were assigned the mission of solving the puzzle.

There was lively discussion at squadron headquarters about how to accomplish the difficult mission. Major L. Tverdokhlebov, a veteran air scout, was the first to give his opinion. Lev Vasilyevich spread out a map on a desk, outlined with a pencil the square in which the main events were occurring:

"Both personnel and equipment can be concealed here in the mountains. I believe that the 'enemy' command is bringing in reserves from here."

"That is perfectly possible," Major V. Lukyanenko said, backing up Tverdokhlebov.

But why hadn't the aerial reconnaissance conducted the day before confirmed this? It turned out that the "enemy" had camouflaged himself well enough to deceive the air scouts. After studying the photographs some more, however, the airmen began to suspect an area which stood out against the background of the overall mountainous mass.

The squadron commander decided to thoroughly investigate the canyon once more. A shortage of time made it impossible to arrange for a large-scale operation. It was in this situation that the airmen demonstrated their tactical know-how....

That night a pair of fighters set out for square "X." Major Tverdokhlebov took off first. Climbing to the required altitude, he began maneuvering over the area where the "enemy" reserves were assumed to be located. These feinting actions did not draw the attention of the opposing side. The pilot then descended through the clouds, passed over the canyon and dropped illumination flares. The unbroken clouds reflected the light from the flashes. The "enemy" gave himself away, opening fire on Tverdokhlebov's aircraft. This was the signal for Major V. Lukyanenko, who had brought his fighter, undetected, up to the area by that time. He began to climb and found himself over an antiaircraft missile complex. He plastered it with fire from everything he had on board.

In the meantime, Major Tverdokhleba had executed a maneuver to counter the anti-aircraft fire, and his fighter swept along the canyon. The missiles launched by the pilot blazed trails through the night sky. Major Tverdokhleba's second attack was against the vehicles which had left their shelter.

Later, when the missile-carriers had landed and the objective control information had been interpreted, the fact was confirmed that the "enemy" had concentrated his reserves precisely in that canyon. They were soon destroyed.

At first glance, the version of combat operations selected by the pilots would appear to conflict with the logic of the mission. After all, concealment is the most sacred of things for air scouts. In this case, however, Major Tverdokhleba drew the attention of the air defense facilities by deliberately showing himself and made it possible for the second scout to approach the target undetected. This guaranteed success for Major Lukyanenko.

The air fighters took into account the fact that the "enemy" had certainly plotted the reconnaissance plane's flyover during the day and become convinced that its camouflage was completely dependable. It could therefore be assumed that during the additional reconnaissance, the air defense facilities would only observe the aircraft and not give themselves away. The fighter attacked so confidently, however, it appeared that the pilot had precise information on the "enemy." Clearly, in this case, the "enemy" needed not only to repel the air raid, but also to prepare for defense: the air strike could have preceded a surprise attack by ground forces. And this is what the "enemy" did.

Major Lukyanenko carried out a complex mission, however, consisting of both reconnaissance and a preliminary strike, so to speak, against the target. This too was based on a knowledge of tactics and of conditions in the mountainous terrain.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

DISCUSSION OF PILOT PSYCHOLOGY, ADAPTATION TO NEW EQUIPMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Vikhrenko, military pilot 1st class: "The Invisible Barrier," "The Pilot and Psychology"]

[Text] Upon concluding the theoretical study of his new aircraft, Major A. Ivanov, a military pilot 1st class, was ready to move on to master the practical aspects of its operation. Among the requirements of this phase of the training was to taxi the aircraft down the runway. Now you would think that there would not be anything simpler for a pilot with more than 1000 hours of flying time. But the flight operations officer suddenly noticed that Ivanov's aircraft was deviating from the axis of the runway and approaching dangerously close to the edge of it. A little closer and the aircraft would run completely off the runway.

"Shut down your engine! Put on your emergency brake!" commanded the flight operations officer.

The aircraft came to a halt on the last slab of the concrete runway.

The reason for what had happened proved to be simple to the point of insult: the pilot had forgotten to engage the mechanism that permits him to turn the front wheel of the aircraft. The aircraft Ivanov had flown previously had not had this mechanism, and he simply had not been conscientious enough in his study of the new type of jet he was going to be flying.

But was this unconscientiousness, this bit of carelessness, really all there was to the problem in this instance? In my opinion, we have to look at cases like this a little more broadly: what we have here is a situation in which the pilot had been unable psychologically to make the adjustment to a new piece of equipment and to the operation of new systems and instruments, to adjust the dynamic stereotype, or pattern, of the motions he was accustomed to making to the new situation during the process of operating the aircraft. Is it really possible that he was unaware of the existence of the mechanism that turns the front landing gear strut? Of course he knew about it, but as he prepared to perform his assigned tasks he was unable to organize his attention as he should have and to divide it properly among the different elements of the exercise. In other words, he failed to work through the psychological model of the task he was to perform and relied instead on his previous experience as a pilot.

Aviation technology is becoming more and more sophisticated as a result of advances in science and engineering and the increasingly rigorous requirements imposed by the demands of modern-day warfare. Each new generation of aircraft in turn makes greater and greater demands of the human being in the cockpit, while the results obtained from the introduction of new technologies will ultimately depend entirely upon the quality of the "pilot-aircraft" system. The advanced capabilities of an aircraft and its armament can be exploited only by the pilot, by a pilot who has completely mastered his aircraft down to the last detail and is able to operate it competently.

But to my way of thinking, there is more to the problem than even this. The rapid advances in technology are continually shifting the focus of the pilot's professional activity from the sphere of the physical in the direction of the intellectual and the psychological, although not by any means at the expense of the former. So the role and importance of a pilot's psychological preparation for flight are continually growing with each passing year. An ability to concentrate on the key factors during the critical moments of a flight, to divide the attention properly during both the piloting of the aircraft and the employment of the aircraft in combat, to analyze and evaluate quickly and accurately a rapidly and unexpectedly changing situation in the air and make the one correct decision — these and a great many other factors comprising the overall degree of mastery a combat pilot reaches will depend to a decisive extent on that pilot's psychological preparation for flight generally and for each individual task he must perform in particular.

The degree to which a pilot is able to exploit the capabilities of an aircraft depends to a great extent on the confidence he has that all the systems of that aircraft are going to function reliably. This confidence comes first and foremost from a thoroughgoing knowledge of the equipment and from the possession of solid skills in the operation of it. So the psychological stability of a pilot will depend directly on the quality of his training.

Captain V. Smirnov had always turned in remarkably consistent performances in firing on ground targets. His commander, however, noticed that as his skills improved, his accuracy in combat engagements, rather than increasing, was remaining constant. Careful analysis of the methods Smirnov was using in aiming revealed that he was using the aiming device in the semiautomatic mode, which as far as the technique of operating it was concerned more closely resembled the equipment he operated on the aircraft he had flown previously. So when a pilot is inadequately or improperly prepared psychologically to use new equipment and weapons, it reduces his effectiveness and results in inefficient and uneconomical exploitation of the capabilities of the technology involved.

For as long as man has been flying, the problem of flight safety has been an inseparable factor in aviation. Emergency situations in the air stem from the greatest variety of causes, and these are studied extensively and systematized. We are always taking steps to deal with these unanticipated situations. According to the international statistics, two out of every three incidents in aviation are related to what is referred to as the human factor. It is pointed out that in identical situations some pilots will lose control and an emergency situation will develop, while others will be able to deal with the situation and maintain control of their aircraft. This has been taken as a basis for



linking specific flight incidents with personal characteristics of the pilot involved. So looked at in these terms, among the factors contributing to the accident rate, the psychological factor by no means ranks least in importance.

The confidence a pilot has in the reliability of his equipment and his ability to keep from being overcome by confusion give him decisiveness and composure and help him extricate himself from even the most difficult situations with honor. The psychological experience a pilot has in dealing with stressful situations can also play an important role in reducing the accident rate. But how is this kind of experience to be acquired if we are talking about completely new equipment and periods of retraining and relearning? Here is where simulators and the personal experience of the instructor can play helpful roles.

Let's look at the example of the following situation. During student V. Chuprov's flight he couldn't get the forward landing gear strut to retract after something hit it. Remaining calm and acting competently and effectively, he was ultimately able to solve the problem and land the aircraft. During the critique following this incident the student reported that he had noticed the malfunction not by the indicator signals, because at that instant his attention had been diverted from the instrument panel, but rather by the characteristic noise in the nose of the aircraft, which he recognized from the flights on which his instructor had had him practice lowering and retracting the landing gear.

Pilot training programs now make fairly extensive use of situations in which the failure of one instrument or another is simulated and the pilot has to operate on his back-up systems. Much less frequently than we should, however, do we use artificially created situations which would have the objective of placing a certain psychological stress on the pilot and of preparing him to take action in emergencies. This problem could be worked to some extent on simulators, but a capability to simulate this kind of situation, unfortunately, still has not been incorporated in their design. In a situation, for example, in which the pilot does the wrong thing, pilot error, or in simulations of the malfunctioning of particular systems or units, the simulator cannot develop this new situation into a training problem, by sending special signals or voice information, for example, or by introducing any other method of creating psychological stress. During periods of simulator training these factors replace the voice of the instructor, of course, but this voice isn't going to be there in the air, so the pilot has to be able to go automatically to stereotypes, patterns worked out and rehearsed on the ground.

The psychological stability a pilot exhibits in an unanticipated difficulty or in an emergency is going to depend to a great extent on how thoroughly he knows the components of all systems of his aircraft. Where there is sound knowledge of the engineering involved there will be the minimum possibility for random, confused or entirely mindless action on the part of a pilot, that is, a minimum of risk and error. We can look here at the now familiar example of what happened in the case of E. Elyan, Hero of the Soviet Union and Honored Test Pilot of the USSR. As he was putting the test aircraft he was flying that day into a climb, Eduard Vaganovich suddenly felt the aircraft bank sharply. Instantly visualizing the aircraft control system, he realized that the problem had to do with the flap and so decided to land the aircraft. During the landing run the flap fell off onto the runway, which confirmed his suspicions during the flight.

In speaking of the psychological preparedness of a pilot to deal in flight with the new, the previously unfamiliar and the unknown, of some of the psychological aspects of the process of mastering the operation of new military equipment and of the need to develop the proper qualities in our combat pilots we cannot neglect to mention as well the equally important factor of the effect on their psychological stability of the confidence they have in their colleagues and of the feelings of comradeship that prevail among them. Today's pilots flying today's aircraft are able to perform a broad range of complex tasks on their own. They can operate independently of their colleagues and yet at the same time feel their closeness, whether they are on the ground or in the air with them. Interaction and cooperation as components of a combat formation, mutual target indication using their onboard systems, close contact with the command post—all this helps them maintain their confidence in the fact that they are not alone despite the fact that there might not be anybody immediately visible within their field of vision and that their colleagues are there to come to their assistance at any time. This helps them deal with the difficulties they encounter, both the objective, external, difficulties and the inner, subjective obstacles they have to surmount, and steady themselves psychologically.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MAJ GEN AVN TABUNSHCHIKOV ON RESULTS OF EARLY SUMMER TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 86 p 1

[Interview with Major General of Aviation A. Tabunshchikov, first deputy commander of aviation of the Leningrad Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Vasilep; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Along with the rest of the Armed Forces, the Air Force is now gearing up for a different kind of training. Please tell us, what would you say most typically characterizes the air combat training for the district's pilots during the summer training period?

[Answer] First of all, I would not draw any really sharp distinctions between what we do during the winter and summer periods, because most of the missions we assign the district's aviators during the winter will be just as timely today. Such things as increasing combat readiness, polishing up general professional military skills, tightening up discipline and a great many other tasks don't have anything to do with the seasons.

But now if you want to look at the various aspects of our reorganization, then I would focus on the change in leadership style at all echelons, beginning with the command structure itself. From instructional directives and guideline documents we are going over to the organization of specific activities at the individual operational locations. We are not only going to show people what has to be done, we're going to be showing them how to do it as well. We're going to be teaching the people responsible for performing the assignments involved and, if necessary, giving the help they need—this is the objective. Training at the first echelon is going to be getting the commanders themselves directly involved along with the deputy commanders and all the staff and political officers. We are trying to get involved in all the various spheres of military activity—from efforts to insure adherence to proper procedures within the individual garrisons and the daily routines to planning and following through with the individual flight shifts and training exercises.

We're also seeing changes in our very approach to the organization of combat training. While many commanders used to concentrate on looking good for the inspectors, frequently at the expense of efforts to insure what would be high-quality military training in fact, the accent now is on the actual level of combat readiness they can achieve. So we are gearing all unit activities so as

to insure that each step forward takes us in the direction we want to go and that we keep the first commandment of competition: use training time for training.

Here's an example of what I mean. Two of our units were recently paid a surprise visit by some higher-echelon staff people, who wanted to check them out under field conditions. Under the most rigorous field conditions, conditions approximating actual combat conditions as nearly as they can be, these units were able to accomplish all their missions successfully. They performed better than they had during the final winter test exercise. This kind of progress is a result of efforts to insure more efficient use of such motivational levers as socialist competition.

[Question] Could you perhaps tell us a little more about the areas in which these improvements lie? Where kind of improvements are we talking about?

[Answer] First and foremost would be the substantial progress we have made in mastering some of the more complex forms of combat training. Out on the training range our pilots have demonstrated their ability to attack ground targets at low and extremely low altitudes using a number of complex maneuvers and at the same an ability to evade the "enemy" air defense in the course of executing their mission. Displaying high levels of mastery of combat skills in one of the regiments we looked at were communists Lieutenant Colonel V. Kuznetsov, sniper combat pilot, and Major Ye. Litvinov, combat pilot 1st class, and in another Guards Majors G. Khoreshko and V. Perevispa. Equipment serviced and prepared by subordinates of Guards Major A. Taranenko, deputy squadron commander for aviation engineering services, performed reliably throughout the entire exercise.

During the summer training period we try not to waste time in unjustifiable repetitions of tactical problems we have already practiced. It is not advantageous economically and, what is most important, does not add anything to combat readiness.

We are now looking more aggressively for new ideas and new approaches and trying harder to tackle the problems we have with the organization of our combat training program. Let's take, for example, a maneuver like diving toward a target from low altitudes during the closing phase of an attack. Now, what used to happen was that these low altitudes were frequently increased and so from the point of view of the practice in aiming we were supposed to get did not place the required demands on the aviators. The level of our piloting skills began to suffer, and on top of that it created a situation which jeopardized flight safety, and this situation, one in which pilot skills are not up to snuff, is fraught with the danger that under conditions which would approach those a pilot would encounter in actual combat he would not be able to control his aircraft properly. We are now taking effective steps to remedy this deficiency.

Or take the problem of the falsification of records. An inspector from district air force headquarters recently noticed that several extra hours of flying time had been added to the records of Lieutenant Colonel V. Kuleshov. Unaccustomed to being called to account for this kind of thing, Kuleshov turned defiant when this was pointed out to him and began to carry on rudely. A comradely court of honor comprised of senior officers condemned Kuleshov's action and took the decision to



initiate the procedures involved in having him dismissed from the ranks of the Armed Forces. The communists administered a severe reprimand carrying with it an entry on his record card, but many have insisted that he be expelled from the party. So, in a word, our efforts are taking a great many different directions.

[Question] What programs, what starts, were made during the winter training period which are still on the agenda?

[Answer] During the winter training period we decided to bring ourselves up to a level where no pilot would have his flight training interrupted beyond what is provided for in the guidelines and every single one of our combat aviators keeps himself in the best shape, in the athletic sense of the term. This is a very difficult problem, and you can't solve it once and for all. So from the very beginning of the summer training period we resolved to put up with no missed flight shifts for any reason, and we can't fly because of the weather, we'll put the simulators to the fullest possible use.

To an even greater extent than during the winter training, we plan to give attention to the problems involved in tightening up military discipline, since discipline constitutes the basis for a high level of combat readiness. It is unfortunate, though, that some of our squadron, flight and company commanders along with a number of group leaders are not putting forth their best efforts here. They have remained distant from their people and have not developed a good knowledge, good familiarity, with them.

But then we can point to some other examples. A motor transport company gave us cause for some concern not long ago, for example. But the commander, Captain A. Kochnev, and his deputy for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant S. Semenov, personally got involved, and things quickly began to improve. The gross violations of military discipline in this organization are now things of the past. The secret of the success achieved here is simple: the young officers began by insuring that personnel within the subunit followed all prescribed military procedures. In addition to placing greater demands on their subordinates, they also took steps to see that all personnel were supplied with everything regulations say they are supposed to have. The barracks here began to taken on a new look, the duty and recreational time schedules were normalized and the leisure time activities were made more interesting and satisfying. In short, exactingness combined with concern for people and enthusiastic, creative attitudes toward duty performance have yielded good results.

Socialist competition is a powerful lever we can use to improve the quality of our combat training. In the Appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the Working People of the Soviet Union, we find emphasis given to the fact that this lever exercises its effect through publicity, objective comparison of performance results, prompt analysis and adoption of new ideas and methods and comradely cooperation and mutual assistance. These are the criteria which will be guiding us in our efforts to achieve the results we are looking for—high levels of combat readiness in all district air force units and subunits,

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## AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### CRITIQUE OF OVERSIMPLIFICATION IN PILOT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by Col V. Vinokurov, military pilot/sharpshooter, Red Banner Carpathian Military District, under the rubric "The Commander and the Contemporary Battle": "Lessons From the Range"]

[Text] In August 1944 a Hitlerite tank column moved along the Shyauliyay-Ionishkis-Yelgava road. Its objective was the rear area of our forces. Ground-attack pilots were ordered to carry out a strike against it.

The squadron commanded by Major G. Denisov (subsequently, Hero of the Soviet Union) was the first to take off. Upon approaching the target, Denisov divided the squadron into two groups: one was to neutralize antiaircraft weapons, and the other was to strike at the column with bombs and rockets. Newly-arrived squadrons then struck at the armored vehicles at the head and bringing up the rear of the column. The ground-attack pilots put around 100 enemy tanks out of action that day. The enemy's plan was frustrated.

Modern fighter-bombers have a far greater range of combat employment than the Il-2 ground-attack planes. This makes corresponding demands also of the flight personnel's training. Only a tactically competent airman who has mastered the firing and flying skills, one with initiative and a strong will, is capable of making a fighter-bomber into a formidable force against the enemy.

Skill does not come by itself, however. I know from my own experience how difficult it is to master the skill of a ground-attack pilot on a modern missile-carrier. There are difficulties of a technical nature and difficulties linked to man's psychological capacity. The flying is done at transonic speeds and low altitudes, for example. The pilot must be able to keep himself in check and have self-control. The ground is right there next to him. In that situation all attention is focused on piloting. It is difficult for the pilot to select from among many similar objects, precisely that target which he is to destroy. In addition, there may be powerful counteraction from the "enemy's" antiaircraft defense. Clearly, only the individual who has achieved the fighter's wisdom without indulgences or simplifications in the training can cope with his mission in this situation.

This is why we carefully plan every flight assignment and complicate the exercises in the daily training of the airmen. This eliminates excessive consumption of supplies and makes it possible to intensify a flight, from takeoff to landing.

Everyone agrees that simplifications and indulgences are inadmissible in the combat training of the airmen. Unfortunately, however, the pilots sometimes operate according to a long-established pattern, the "classic" pattern, so to speak: takeoff and a flight along the route to a familiar range, to accustomed targets. This kind of practice gives the airmen little, of course. Furthermore, it accustoms them to routine action. Because of this, one only has to complicate a mission slightly, to force the crew to operate in an unaccustomed situation, and the crew becomes confused. This sort of thing once happened to Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Redko, a squadron commander, for example. After being given a new, hypothetical situation in the air, the squadron commander only succeeded in getting his group onto the range at the third approach.

Sometimes, under the pretext of observing safety measures, the pilots perform flights at altitudes other than those specified for the exercise and do not execute fighter- or missile-evasion maneuvers, which are indicated merely for the sake of a "checkmark" in the combat training plan. The closeness of the earth increases the element of danger, of course, and the psychological stress. But a pilot is obligated to "work up to flying" in precisely that situation in which he will be operating in actual combat and must be constantly prepared for unanticipated actions. It will be too late to refine the training during combat operations.

In short, every flight must represent another step up the ladder of flying skill. The vast majority of commanders base their work with subordinates on this premise. Take Lieutenant Colonel G. Timoshenko, military pilot 1st class, for example. He does not mind spending the time required to work with subordinates and prepare them for flights with combat application. He works skillfully with the flight commanders, teaches them methodological skill and imparts his skills as an instructor to them.

Good results cannot be achieved from the combat application without a solid knowledge of air tactics and of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, without the ability to maneuver in various battle formations and to work rapidly with the weapon controls when there is little time. This is why Lieutenant Colonel Timoshenko attaches great importance to regular exercises in trainers and to flights to the range.

In order to improve the effectiveness of each flight to the tactical range, among other things, the squadron commander sees to it that the target situation at the range is constantly changed. The pilots acquire skills in seeking and detecting ground targets, and develop keenness of observation and a good eye. And conditions approaching actual combat are created by making several approaches from different directions on a single flight, by maneuvering vigorously within the range of air defense facilities and over the target.

Wherever preparations for combat application do not receive proper attention, where the pilots count on prompting from the command post, they operate with uncertainty and without initiative. On a repeat approach to the range many of the aircraft in the group led by Major A. Nikonov were "destroyed" by "enemy" air defense facilities, for example. The leader did not demonstrate creativity.

He took the same flight route traveled by the airmen in an adjacent subunit the day before. There were no surprises for the "enemy." The enemy was able to rapidly get his bearings in the situation, plot the high-speed, low-flying targets and effect a strike against them.

Precise calculation, the will to be victorious, circumspection, a readiness to take daring and imaginative action, and the ability to figure out the "enemy's" plan--these are the qualities which the fighter-bomber pilot must possess. Only decisiveness and initiative combined with precise calculation can lead to success on training flights and in actual combat.

Our ranges, which serve as the "enemy," so to speak, must also be discussed specially. After all, the effectiveness and the quality of the pilots' training depends in great part on what kind of target setup they have and upon the tactical competence with which the range teams use it. A great deal has been done of late to see that the ranges serve as a real tactical training school for the pilots. We cannot close our eyes to the shortcomings which exist, however. I believe the time has arrived to make full use of electronics on the ranges for evaluating the performance of every airman. Otherwise, what do we sometimes find. A squadron is given an evaluation for the tactical exercise based on the number of targets destroyed. And this is correct. Who made the hits, however? This question cannot be answered. When the results are summed up, those who missed are therefore given the same good evaluations as those who sent the missiles and bombs accurately to the target. This sort of "performance-leveling" should not be.

Nor should there be such cases as this. Let us say that the crews have taken off to practice their next regular exercises. On the way to the target area, the pilots use deceptive maneuvers and try to conceal their plan in order to destroy the "enemy" with a sudden and powerful strike. Upon reaching the range, however, they see that no one has even bothered with camouflage. The targets are arranged exactly like those in the visual aids at school. Just fly in and hit them.

The range workers complain that they cannot do all of this. He who looks for a way out of a situation always finds one, however. Unfortunately, we frequently encounter deficiencies. Take the following case. The range did not have the needed number of small, moving targets against which the fighter-bombers were supposed to operate. The range crew demonstrated "creativity" in this instance, and the pilots attacked... ground covered with lime. It is not necessary to prove that firing at flat, nonmoving targets is clearly a simplification, that it contributes little to the development of combat skill. We are still not engaged in a determined campaign against such simplifications, however.

When practicing striking at small targets, it is important for pilots to learn the result of his attack while still at the range, in order to consider any possible error when he makes the next run or another flight. Since the range does not have such objective control facilities, however, deviations from the standard are frequently determined visually. It is time to put an end to this as well. It is a matter of the pilots' combat readiness, after all.



In my opinion, the rationalizers, people with a bent for technical creativity, could be invaluable in the successful resolution of these problems. They should therefore be mobilized, assigned specific tasks and given assistance.

Modern combat demands a high level of skill of pilots in the fighter-bomber aviation. And in order for them to add to the glorious traditions of the heroic ground-attack pilots with their military work, we need to train them more persistently today under conditions approaching actual combat.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

ARTICLE DISCUSSES CAREER OF MAJ GEN AVN N.T. ANTOSHKIN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jun 86 pp 3-4

[Article by Col V. Filatov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent, Chernobyl AES-Kiev-Moscow, under the rubric "Military Character": "At a Time of Trial"]

[Text] 1. He learned about the accident at the Chernobyl AES almost as soon as it happened, but he did not know and could not imagine how it would personally affect him, a major general of aviation.

The way our military men are, if they are military to the core, at the very news of a flood, an earthquake, tornadoes or a hurricane with large-scale effects in our country, a certain mechanism is immediately activated in them, and the arrow stops at once on the mark labeled: "Combat Readiness." Our regulations plainly state that servicemen must provide the civilian population with assistance "in the case of accidents, fires and natural disasters...."

2. Nikolay Timofeyevich Antoshkin is a young general, only the second year in that rank, and he is only 44 years old. One can be an excellent pilot but not become a general, but one cannot become a general if one is a poor pilot--this is the way it is in the aviation. He always flew better than those with whom he was flying. That's the way it was in the sky. Even in school, however, he always received "fives" on all his exams. He was among the top in his graduating class at the Orenburg Higher Military Air School for Pilots imeni Ivan Semenovich Polbin. He began his regular service in the Red Banner Belorussian Military District. This was not the beginning of his working career, however. He began it when he was exactly 7 years old, began it as a rural shepherd-boy. There were eight children in the family. His father was a disabled war veteran, his mother a housewife. After working as a shepherd, he went to work as an unskilled laborer in a coal mine, after which he worked at an electric power plant.... All of this he did before entering flight school. The future major general was also distinguished by a love for sports. He had ratings in several different sports when he entered the school.

He began flying planes and helicopters while still in the Belorussian Military District. He would have flown a broom, as they say, if it had had any kind of engine at all. The sky became his home.

He went from the Belorussian Military District to the Red Banner Far East Military District. The year was 1969.... Something was lacking. And perhaps

his own spiritual state permitted him to understand for the first time the origins of a feat, of self-sacrifice, of the destinies of front-line heroes. At that point, he left for the Military Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin.

No one is indifferent to what others think about them, but not everyone is able to apply rigid criteria for assessing himself. When some people are praised, they get soft and they are lost; when others are praised, they do not believe it. When some people are severely criticized, they lose heart; when others are criticized, they do not exactly jump to change things in their lives, but only become angrier, perhaps as a jumper becomes angry at a height which he has not yet been able to jump. This is a matter of personality, of one's path, one's destiny. And a matter of responsibility.

He graduated with brilliant marks from the Academy imeni Gagarin just as he had from the School imeni Polbin. He had the theory behind what he had already done, but he did not yet have a theory for the future. He took over a squadron in the Red Banner Odessa Military District and made it an excellent squadron within a year. After 1 more year, N. Antoshkin was commander of an air regiment in the Turkestan Military District. The regiment won the Challenge Red Banner of the district military council for the first time under his command. And it was always at the cutting edge, in a state of tension, completely mobilized....

By the time he entered the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov, he had turned a total of one squadron and three regiments into excellent units, for which he was awarded the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," third degree.

He became a party member while still a cadet.

Something else: many pilots were awarded orders every year in the regiments which he commanded. A total of 27 pilots entered academies or were promoted from his last regiment alone. Among the people he developed there are regimental commanders, and three of them are candidates of military sciences.... They grow wiser alongside a wise one and strive after him who is himself advancing.

N. Antoshkin graduated from the General Staff Academy with distinction.

He spent the day of 26 April 1986 with a sort of vague premonition. The general did not show what he was feeling inside, however. He did perhaps pick up the telephone somewhat more quickly than usual when it rang.

3. The day was rapidly coming to an end, however, and that call had not been received. When he got out of the vehicle, he told the driver not to leave but to wait near the entrance. He climbed the stairs to the floor on which he lived with his family: son Sergey, of draft age but presently a first-year student at an institute—poor vision had kept him from entering a military school; daughter Lena, a fourth-grade student; and his wife.

He did not change into home attire. He washed his hands and sat down to dinner, casting a glance at the telephone. He was increasingly confident that the call would come. Inwardly, he was ready for it. Right now, he was pondering where he should begin, what should be done immediately, what later.... Daughter Lena was playing with dolls. His wife was busy at the stove. Through the window one could see the last of the sunset, like red-hot metal. The telephone rang. He knew that this was the call even before he picked up the telephone.

"Urgent call for district commander...."

"Speaking...."

Within a matter of minutes he was in the office of the commander of the Red Banner Kiev Military District. Later, I would find out why the call came there, to the apartment of Antoshkin, chief of staff of district air forces. I learned that he had simply been reached before anyone else and had responded to the call ahead of everyone.... Intuition, it turns out, is not of least importance even for a general. He was not the first of the aviators to arrive at the district commander's office, however. Lieutenant General of Aviation Nikolay Petrovich Kryukov, commander of Kiev Military District Air Forces, was already there....

The hour arrived: "leave immediately for the city of Prip'yat. It has been decided to pour sand onto the damaged unit.... The reactor is 30 meters tall.... The job can obviously not be done with anything other than helicopters.... Proceed at Prip'yat according to the situation.... Keep in constant touch with us...."

On the way to headquarters, he and the commander of district air forces succeeded in alerting the helicopter pilots and Lieutenant Colonel Kushnin, chief of the chemical service. The helicopter pilots were based so far from Prip'yat and Chernobyl that they would be unable to work at the AES from there. The situation required that they be brought closer to the site of events. Lieutenant Colonel A. Kushnin was needed because it had been decided that Antoshkin would immediately leave by vehicle for the site of the accident and take the chemical service chief along as a specialist. They had to make a lot of arrangements at once.... All of it took only brief minutes or even seconds.

There was risk involved in transferring helicopters at night, to an unfamiliar field--and in a hurry, of course. It would have been better to delay until morning. But what if the weather should turn bad on the route by morning? What then? They calculated that losses might be greater, and assigned the flight route and the takeoff time for the first helicopters. They were not waiting for morning.

How many minutes, hours, days, weeks or months must we wait to learn about events, in order later to say that they did or did not begin unexpectedly? Let us say that a mine has exploded. For whom was it unexpected? For the one who overlooked it. A hurricane blows in and destroys everything. For whom was it unexpected? For anyone else, but not for the weather man: he simply missed the hurricane. The word "unexpected" does not exist in the vocabulary of a first-rate military man. A surprise enemy attack. A surprise thrust by the enemy.



This is only possible with respect to those who have not properly organized reconnaissance, those who lack intuition, foresight and precise calculation--in other words, those who do not have complete information. One thing is indisputable: a military man must always be prepared for any unexpected event....

Upon hearing about the accident at the AES, Antoshkin immediately sensed that this was an extraordinary event, a superserious event--an event without precedent, they now say. As a military man to the core, Antoshkin sensed the scope of the danger. This is what formed an image in his mind of his actions, should he become involved in the matter. The initial kaleidoscope of thoughts settled into a precise line of jobs and acts: sandbags-helicopter; sandbag drop-distance from runway to reactor; runway-base; reactor-radiation-decontamination of personnel and equipment.... The main thing right then were the helicopters, however, and getting them to the area of operations....

He had not left his office, was still at headquarters, but somewhere, hundreds of kilometers away, at the will of General Kryukov and the will of General Antoshkin, people were already running to their aircraft, removing the covers from them and starting the engines, breaking up the night with the light of headlights and searchlights; radar antennas were beginning to rotate, commanders at various levels were contacting one another. What the generals had thought out and calculated became the actions and the concern of hundreds of people in the air forces in various parts of the district. The hearts of all those who received the order and those affected by it began beating at a single rate within a minute or so. This could be felt in the reports from the sites.

We are sometimes amazed at how one commander will react almost instantaneously to a rapid change in the situation, while another will vacillate: everything goes wrong for him; nothing works out right; everything is out of kilter. There is nothing surprising about it, however. It is simply that the one prepares himself all his life, every day, for the unexpected, before the unexpected strikes, while the latter only begins thinking after the unexpected has occurred.

4. Stars were shining brilliantly over the city when he and Lieutenant Colonel Kushnin left Kiev. For some time the road was empty, and they did not worry about the speed. They began encountering vehicles, however, more and more of them. Mainly busses filled people as though at the peak hour.

It was the evacuation....

The wave of evacuees rolled on. A short time later, busses were streaming by in an unbroken line, like coupled railroad cars, like an endless train. They were traveling upstream, in danger of being washed away at any moment. They had to get to Pripyat even more urgently than the busses needed to leave it, however. And the driver did not slacken his speed.

5. They made their way into Pripyat late in the night. All of the windows in the office buildings were ablaze with light. The city buzzed like a disturbed beehive. People were everywhere at the city party committee, in the offices and in the halls. Antoshkin immediately reported to the chairman of the government committee set up to deal with the effects of the accident. This was B. Shcherbina,

deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. People swarmed around him. Everyone wanted instructions, and everyone received instructions from him--clear and concise. He had a thorough discussion, considering the circumstances, with General Antoshkin. "All our hopes are now pinned on you, on your helicopters. The crater must be tightly sealed off with sand. The reactor cannot be approached from anywhere but above. Your helicopters are the only possibility. When do we start? Right now. Immediately. We can't? Not until dawn? Then right at day-break. Every minute.... You understand me, do you not, General? You take everything into your hands...."

The mission had been received.

The poet Mayakovskiy called this a social order. He would begin creating in such a case. Out of nothing, out of the rumble, as he put it, poetry was born. Create, general, like the poet--out of nothing, out of the rumble alone. Where was the sand? Where were the helicopters? Who would load the helicopters? By what route would they approach the fourth unit from the air? From what height would they drop the bags? What was the radiation level? Could we send pilots up to the crater at all? The helicopters would have to be directed in the air. How? Who? From where?... Military pilots had never before done anything like this. What sandbags?... Create, general, like the poet--out of nothing.

Sooner or later, there comes a time for every commander when so-called unexpected events are the order of the day. They must be commanded, must be controlled, or else those events will set him spinning. Envelop him. Make him absolutely ineffective. Such is the military reality. Later, those who worked with the general, were next to him, would say that they did not recall ever seeing him eat or sleep. The general himself told me, incidentally, that he lost 5 kilograms during the first 2 days at Pripyat. Colonel A. Puzin, political worker, would add: "We all suffered from the same thing--lack of sleep. It was a problem to keep from falling asleep on one's feet. We kept going, because we saw how tireless and energetic our general was...."

Colonel Puzin arrived in Pripyat on 27 April. Not by vehicle, as General Antoshkin had a few hours previously. He arrived on a helicopter. In other words, there was already a place for the helicopters to land.... A helicopter pad? There was still none, and nothing could be done about it. All around Pripyat was water, a sea of sand and boggy fields. No place to land helicopters. Water, sand and boggy ground are not for a helicopter.

The general had never before been in Pripyat, never flown over the city. Upon arriving, however, he immediately grasped the whole layout. Except for the square in front of the building housing the party gorkom, there was no place to land helicopters. Not bothering to determine where there was radiation, or how much, he darted around and examined the air approaches to the square. At first, everyone was appalled at the idea of landing helicopters next to the main city park, right beneath the windows of the gorkom building, but... they had confidence in the general. It was an emergency, and they immediately began viewing the man in the uniform as an organized force capable of countering the danger. It has always been this way, and it will always be so.

Later, the helicopter pilots would talk about what it took for them to reach that square by air. It was a real aerial slalom along a route with gradations of difficulty-- "high B," as they say. Incidentally, those who flew over to drop the bags and those who flew over to measure the radiation above the crater or to photograph it, would tell me over and over about the aerial slalom. The helicopter pilots performed all of their work above the crater, among the funnels which stood like the poles along the route of that slalom. If it had been only the funnels, though.... I shall tell about the rest further on. Once, however, when I was hearing about the slalom, I suddenly thought to myself: a helicopter is not a bird. It can fall.... It is a disaster when this happens in an open field. But near a reactor, or right over a reactor, and with that aerial slalom....

I could not help asking the general whether he had considered this risk. "And how!" he answered. "I have even spoken to the pilots about it more than once before the day's flight work began." He considered also one other fact, however, which offset the risk: with rare exceptions, all of the crews were made up of pilots 1st class, and many of them had combat orders....

Dawn was approaching, and he summoned the first pair of helicopters to Pripyat. The pair had to be received. Without orders from ground, without a controller on the ground, they could not land in that situation. The general climbed onto the roof of the Pripyat Hotel with his radio set and directed the flights from there for some time. There, on the hotel roof, he took the place of an entire takeoff and landing service by himself. A mockup of the fourth unit was constantly set up in front of him, and he tried to guide his crews in an arc separated from the raging reactor as far as possible. He was looking out for the men.

Veteran pilots B. Nesterov and A. Serebryakov arrived with the first crews. They thoroughly inspected the entire territory of the AES and the area around it from the air. They then drew up the plan for approaching the reactor to drop the bags. Flight operations could now be confidently turned over to Colonel V. Nesterov. And he took his place on the roof of the hotel. In the meantime, General Antoshkin and Colonel Serebryakov were busy with the sandbags. These were now the most important thing. No one would believe, probably, that the first bags were filled with sand all at once. Flight operations officer Nesterov took the helicopter up for the first drop, acting as ranging unit.

How were they dropped? The airmen hovered over the crater, opened the door and, looking into the mouth and aiming by sight, dropped the sandbags. Pilots and technicians. And those were not the sun's rays flooding out of the mouth of the crater. Everyone was well aware of this. But they were thinking about... the bags. There were few of them, and they soon ran out. Again, few people will believe this, but the general raced to a nearby village in his Uazik and gathered up a bunch of sacks from the households there. They had to maintain the sand drop for just a very short time, not permit it to stop for a second, because as many bags as they needed would be delivered at any time: people in helicopters were even then rushing off to get them. This is the way it was....

6. On 27 April so much sand was dropped into the mouth of the crater that no one had any doubt: it was a very large amount, considering the fact that one helicopter could take on board only a few bags and that arms and shoulders were the only means of mechanization. At 1900 Antoshkin reported the number of tons, not

without a sense of pride, to B. Shcherbina. He did not expect praise, but he also did not expect such displeasure. In a word, he was told that this number of tons was to the fourth unit as a grain of sand to an elephant. Not merely too little, but as a grain of sand to an elephant. He was discouraged only for a minute. The next minute, he was once again in that state of composure and tautness in which he found himself when, under extreme tension, he had attempted to catch a determined opponent in the sight of his fighter in the maelstrom of an air battle.

A bottleneck? Where is it? Bags? Loaded? How are we going to drop them?...

And time was running out. It was no longer a matter even of hours, but of minutes.

Between 1900 and 2100 he managed to work out, to put it mildly, relations with those officials upon whom the provision of the helicopter pilots with bags and sand depended. He had to work on some of the personnel while on the move, to turn inefficiency into efficiency, to straighten out those who did not know what they were doing.... There was no other way in that situation.

We have the sacks.

Loaded.

How are we going to drop them?...

On 28 April they dropped more than twice as much as the day before....

Once again, B. Shcherbina probably thought that it was as a grain of sand to an elephant. There was a mountain, so to speak, of bags at the site. Enough workers too. No increase could be expected. But there had to be a massive attack on the reactor. What could they do? How could they enlarge the drop? No one knew. Not the chairman of the government commission. Not the academics. Nor the various specialists. They knew only that it had to be increased many times over.

It was the dead of night. The crews were asleep. They would have a hard day again tomorrow. The general alone did not sleep. As a grain of sand to an elephant.... It could not be a matter of increasing the tonnage or the frequency. How, then? Here were the sacks, here were the helicopters.... There was a limit. Think, general. The general had to think for all of the crews at once, for all of the loaders at once. There was nothing more they could do. Everything depended upon him. Something drastic had to be done. It was the dead of night. The crews were sleeping. Only the general did not sleep.

On 29 April three times as much was dropped into the crater as the day before....

The general had come up with something during that night of his. He decided to use some old, written-off containers. They were light and very transportable. If they took those containers, written-off and of use to no one, and filled them with sandbags. Like enormous pouches. And then lifted them by straps with helicopters, towed them to the mouth of the crater and dropped the whole thing into it. He made the calculations and drew up the blueprint for the suspension system by means of



which the containers would be attached to the helicopters the next day. He got his assistants up in the middle of the night and assigned the work: tomorrow, there must be an unlimited number of containers at the helicopter site. The suspensions would also have to be readied by morning. He showed them the drawings. Each of them would be of metal. Each would weigh more than 5 kilograms, up to 16 kilograms for the heavy helicopters. Not every plant could handle this. Only a little more than 3 hours remained until dawn.

Measured in terms of normal days, it would take months to have the containers at the site, even with the tightest of schedules. Some people would be sent to look for them, which would take weeks, and then the paperwork carousel would begin to whirl.... Possible, no one would undertake to make such a suspension system. I saw it at the helicopter site: a complicated thing. An engineer, lathe operators and electric welders all worked on it. It was an important device. Perhaps--no, certainly--it should be patented as an invention.

The containers and the suspension systems designed by General Antoshkin were at the site by morning. This simply has to be recorded somewhere as a record for the embodiment of a concept in a concrete article. During the day, as many of the suspension systems as they needed were brought to the site. The first were delivered at night: the workers at one of the Chernigov plants had gone into action before dawn.

But... at 1900, when the results were summed up, they still said "as a grain of sand to an elephant." On top of it all, the helicopter pad, from which it was just a stone's throw to the fourth unit, had to be moved immediately. In the language of the military this is known as abandoning a well-equipped position and withdrawing to lines prepared in advance. In short, general, retreat and add additional minutes to the time required to fly to the reactor. And the commission, in the person of its chairman, demanded that the drop be enlarged not in terms of tons but in terms of frequency.... The situation demanded this.

The sound of helicopter engines roared through the bright day. The crews were now sleeping and resting up, after first washing away all the dust and dirt under a refreshing shower and changing the underwear and uniforms in which they had spent the day in the area of Chernobyl. Their aircraft were also being decontaminated. They were cooled down a little by the powerful streams of special liquid. But what about tomorrow? What thoughts and revelations of the general would make the men stronger and more proficient? One would merely bring shame upon oneself forever with a "just get it done" approach. How fast would the Uazik travel? A hundred kilometers per hour, let us say. Could it travel at a speed of 300 kilometers? It could, if it had a different engine and wings. A different quality. That is how it was with the drop: a different quality and other methods were needed.

7. On 30 April more than twice as much was dumped onto the crater as was dropped the day before....

What had the general come up with during the night? Nothing. He recalled something, and upon recalling it, he made a mental bow to a front-line fighter. That front-line fighter was Ivan Semenovitch Polbin, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation. He had not quite lived to see the Victory, but had died in the performance of a combat mission. Legends about him traveled all the

fronts. He defeated the enemy creatively, with his mind. Every battle was like a work of art. The so-called "whirligig," "the Polbin whirligig," went down in the history of military art under his name. Ivan Semenovitch developed and put into the practices of combat operations a plan for a group diving attack for the highly effective destruction of small targets. Such an attack consisted of the following: upon arriving at the target, the bombers would form a closed circle, maintaining an interval of 500-600 meters between aircraft, and successively dive on the target, one after another, at an angle of up to 70 degrees. When the first aircraft had dropped its bombs and pulled out of the dive, the second was already headed toward the ground at a specific angle, while a third was just going into a dive. Many interesting things are linked with General Polbin's name. The following, for example: he discovered new features in the Pe-2 bomber, features which not even the designer of the Pe-2 suspected. Polbin "taught" the bomber how to be as agile as a fighter, and he performed aerobatics with it. According to the design specifications, the Pe-2 should not have carried more than 600-700 kilograms of bombs. Polbin suspended up to 1,100 kilograms from it.

This is the legendary person with whom General Antoshkin took council on the night of 30 April. Nikolay Timofeyevich redid Polbin's calculations as applicable to helicopters--different speeds, different flight--drew up the plans for the next day's "whirligig" and calculated the route by which the helicopters would approach it, how they would enter into and break out of it. It was as though Ivan Semenovitch Polbin himself were sitting across from Antoshkin and telling him what to do the next day. The Great Patriotic War. A great battle. Great were the participants in it. Great were their ideas. They are eternal. They will always help us.

It turned out that several helicopters could be involved in the "whirligig" at once. Polbin used more aircraft, but this was when he was subjecting his concept to practical testing. Let us start, for now, with what was possible in the given situation. A nuclear reactor was below one. This was not an enemy anti-aircraft gun. It was far more powerful.... He calculated the tonnage: twice as much as the day before.

And now down to specifics. No matter how many bags were available the next day, it would not be enough for this kind of drop. Furthermore, the loaders, of which there was an abundance that day, would be used up immediately the following. A solution had to be found right then....

Even the most remarkable discovery can be worth nothing if it is not understood by those around the project, if people with a talent on a level with the discovery are not found to put it into effect. General Antoshkin had magnificent assistants. Once again, he ended the night in the company of Nesterov and Serebryakov. The concept was now being shifted to the shoulders of the pilots, technicians and loaders, all of those who would on 30 April drop those tons of sand into the pinhead-mouth of the crater.

At 1900 on 30 April, when General Antoshkin reported the number of tons dropped to the chairman of the government commission, there was no applause. The face of the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers did light up, however. The general was not offended. He too understood that they needed to drop as much as possible. Danger still stalked round the AES. Since sand was presently the best

medicine for the sick reactor, the dosage had to be increased, had to be supplemented. Candidly speaking, however, how was it to be increased? How was it to be supplemented? Only 3 days ago, they had strained themselves to the breaking point to drop what seemed like an enormous amount of sand. Today, they had dropped more than 15 times the amount dropped the first day. And with the same helicopters and the same bags as they had had 3 days before.

On 1 May the helicopter pilots dropped one quarter more sand into the crater than they had dropped the day before.

Once again, the dead of night. General Antoshkin and his closest assistant did not sleep, just as they had not slept the day before, the day before that and three nights previously. They had always been alongside Antoshkin in his night-time vigils, however. And now, they recall that their greatest danger was that they might fall asleep on their feet, from chronic loss of it. This is not a figure of speech. It is how they lived during the first and most alarming days after the accident.

8. Once again, a blank sheet of paper symbolized tomorrow. What is this with your helicopters, general? You now have three different types. This means that they have different speeds and different hauling capacities, does it not? They are all based at the same site. What if you should transfer each type to a separate pad? What would this do? It would mean that you could calculate down to the second the time each type of helicopter would enter the "whirligig." And what would this do? Let us do some figuring. There, we have it. It would make it possible to increase the "whirligig's" speed of rotation without detriment to safety.

When, at 1900 on 1 May, the results of the day's work were summed up, as was the practice there, General Antoshkin reported to the chairman of the government commission in the presence of all the commission members, the number of tons dropped into the crater on 1 May, something incredible happened, something which had not happened before that day at the commission's meetings: there was applause. The deputy chairman of the USSR Council applauded. The ministers and deputy ministers applauded. And so did the academics and specialists (40 people were present at that meeting). B. Shcherbina immediately expressed his gratitude to all of the helicopter pilots.

He then announced that the following day only half the amount of sand dropped that day would be required at the crater.

There it was: victory. Perhaps not a final victory, but a victory nonetheless!

I asked General Antoshkin what more he would have done, what else he would have undertaken, on 2 May, if the reduction in the amount of sand to be dropped had not been announced. He said that he had had an entire night before the dawn on 2 May, world's of time, that he would certainly have thought up some way to increase the tonnage of 1 May. This is how it would have been, had it been necessary. Helicopter pilots of the Air Forces delivered to the fourth reactor and dropped into the crater 5,000 tons of various materials to form that plug of sand and lead which "sealed off" the damaged reactor.

The next day, in Report No. 7 of 2 May 1986, the government commission stated, in addition to everything else, the following: "Include in the record the good organization of the work performed by the Air Forces during the period 27 April to 2 May 1986 in the execution of assignments involved in mopping-up operations at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, the selflessness demonstrated by the personnel, and the good personal qualities and initiative of Major General of Aviation N.T. Antoshkin.... Chairman of the Government Commission and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers B. Shcherbina."

9. After receiving the allowable dose of roentgens, the general was withdrawn from the area of the Chernobyl AES. I did not find him at the hospital. I was told: "He just up and left...." I met with Antoshkin in his office at work. He had a pile of blank paper in front of him. The general was working on an article analyzing the experience which he had acquired there in the struggle with the accident. A military man, he regarded also this problem from a military standpoint. The experience had confirmed some things in his early theoretical findings and decisively corrected or even disproved other things. Everything acquired there had to be systematized and analyzed without delay, and new methods had to be devised. He told me that this part of the work was just as important to him at the present time as that which the general had done at Pripyat and Chernobyl.

At our last meeting this is what the general persistently asked me to do: If you write about it, write about what selfless people we have. And he gave their names: Puzin, Nesterov, Serebryakov, Kushnin, Kosyanenko, Blagodatnyy, Bilogan, Yakovlev, Volkosub, Yurko.... He said that all of them are the kind of Communists with whom one is not afraid to go out on the most risk-filled and dangerous missions.

He then talked about Captain Leonid Voytko, commander of a helicopter detachment. He had been there as the secretary of the primary party organization and had come forth with an initiative: "All of your strength and energy--your lives, if necessary--into the performance of the government mission." All of the crews began to live in accordance with this.

Nor could Antoshkin refrain from saying good things about the chemists, combat engineers, vehicle drivers and fightingmen of other branches of troops, who had also performed in a worthy manner during the time of trial.

The general made special mention of the fact that during the entire period there had not been a single infraction of military discipline, not a single demonstration of cowardliness or alarmism. At the end, I asked the general what he had derived from all those events for combat. I cannot recount his entire reply in a single newspaper column, however large it may be, but I can give some of it. The first thing was a particular work style--he called it a no-red-tape, efficient and concrete style--whereby man is at the center. Something else is also necessary: a moral right to call upon people, and for this one needs to be constantly at the center of events himself, to be there where it is most dangerous. This inspires subordinates....

This is precisely how he has always lived, how he lived before the accident and how he lived during it, as he helped to mop up after the accident. It is how the young general and Communist, one of those to whom the people have entrusted the homeland's security, lives today.



6 October 1986

DOSAAF

## MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN ARKHANGELSK OBLAST

PM050745 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 August 1986 First Edition carries on page 2 a 1,500-word article by Yu. Sapozhnikov, secretary of Arkhangelsk CPSU Obkom, under the heading "Time for Maturation," on the military and patriotic education of young people in Arkhangelsk Oblast. Opening his article with a brief description of a meeting arranged between young conscripts and soldiers returned from Afghanistan, at which one of the latter remarks:

"Our weapons are reliable but I will not hide the fact that service was not easy," Sapozhnikov outlines all the measures taken by the oblast to provide young people with military and patriotic education. "All this is indeed good," he continues, but there are also serious problems in my view. "Some healthy youths "find it difficult to pull themselves up on a crossbar," he says. "One feels that if these young men were to find himself in a difficult situation, neither strength of character nor a high degree of ideological commitment would help them to worthily fulfill their military duty," Sapozhnikov comments. "Practice confirms," he concludes, "that the time has come to broaden the functions of DOSAAF committees as the organizers and methodology centers of all mass defense work." Measures are being taken, he writes, to ensure that "young people's leisure is filled and that they are trained for military service and for working in the national economy."

/6662

CSO: 1801/252

6 October 1986

## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

## BRIEFS

POLISH ORDER TO MEDICAL ACADEMY—For its major contribution to the training of medical personnel for the Polish Armed Forces the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy has been awarded the "Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Polish People's Republic." Addressing those gathered for the ceremony was General of Division V. Oliva, deputy minister of national defense of the Polish People's Republic. He warmly congratulated the command personnel, the faculty and the student body on receiving this award and added the order to the academy colors. The academy commandant, Colonel General of Medical Services N. Ivanov, expressed his deep appreciation to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, the State Council and the government of the Polish People's Republic for the great honor they had done the efforts of the academy. Attending the award presentation ceremony were Colonel General of Medical Services F. Komarov, chief of the Central Military Medical Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, V. Yagelnitskiy, consul-general of the Polish People's Republic in Leningrad and Brigadier General A. Chernov, army, navy and air force attache with the embassy of the Polish People's Republic in the USSR. [By Colonel of Medical Services S. Frolov] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 86 p 3] 8963

CSO: 1801/225

## MILITARY HISTORY

### ROLE OF WW II STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 86 p 4

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Res) N. Komarov, under the rubric "Pages of History": "According to the Laws of Wartime"]

[Text] Our Communist Party and its Central Committee led the homeland's defense from the first days of the Great Patriotic War. As one of the priority military-political tasks, a great deal of attention was given to restructuring the agencies of management of the Soviet State. The restructuring was based on the Leninist principle of maximum centralization of political, economic and military leadership.

On 30 June 1941 the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of People's Commissars passed a decree on the establishment of the State Defense Committee (GKO). The decree stated that all power in the state would be concentrated in the GKO, that all citizens and all party, soviet, Komsomol and military agencies were required to unquestioningly carry out its decisions and orders. I.V. Stalin was confirmed as chairman of the GKO.

This decision was based on the experience of the civil war, when the Council of Labor and Defense headed by V.I. Lenin was established and functioned successfully in the young Soviet State. It was the prototype of the GKO, which was an extraordinary agency designed to function under the conditions of the extremely difficult war imposed upon our nation by fascist Germany.

Decrees of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws. For resolving specific matters, the GKO relied on the USSR Council of People's Commissars and its local agents, and on the extraordinary agencies set up in many cities near the front: city defense committees, which combined all civilian and military authority under their control. These committees were established in more than 60 of the nation's cities, including Leningrad, Sevastopol, Tula, Stalingrad and Kursk.

Organizing the vital functioning of the Soviet society under the wartime laws required an enormous effort on the part of the nation's higher military-political leadership. The scope of the GKO's activities can be assessed from the fact that it passed almost 10,000 decrees during the 1,418 days of the war. Around two thirds of them dealt in one way or another with the military economy and the

organization of munitions production. The GKO's Operations Office oversaw the routine operations of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, the NKPS [People's Commissariat of Railroads] and the people's commissariats of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, electric power plants, the coal, petroleum and chemical industry.

The State Defense Committee performed a multifaceted job: it directed the efforts of the people's commissariats for purposes of making full use of all the material and spiritual capabilities for achieving victory over the enemy; it decided on matters having to do with the mobilization of human resources to meet the needs of the national economy; it directed the evacuation of industrial enterprises from threatened areas to areas liberated from the German fascist invaders, and the restoration of the war-devastated economy; and it established volumes and schedules for industry's delivery of armaments for the army and navy. The comprehensive resolution of these problems helped to considerably enhance the fighting strength of our Armed Forces.

The GKO kept a close eye on the state of the Armed Forces, on their development and buildup. It assigned military-political missions to them, improved their organizational structure, distributed their leading cadres and defined the general way in which the front-line groupings were to be used in the armed struggle. The GKO implemented its strategic direction of the armed struggle through Headquarters, Supreme High Command.

Fascist Germany's treacherous attack and the invasion into our nation's interior by the Hitlerite war machine prevented the completion of the program for preparing reserves. In addition to this, the forces in our first strategic echelon suffered considerable losses at the beginning of the war. All of this made it urgent to create new reserves. After assessing the situation, the GKO issued the decree "On the Preparation of Reserves Within the System of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Navy" on 16 July 1941. Implementation of the measures outlined enabled the Soviet command not only to frustrate the aggressor's plans, but also to create the preconditions essential for the enemy's total defeat.

The organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces was also improved. On 9 November 1941 the GKO passed the decree "On Intensifying and Reinforcing Air Defense of the Soviet Union's Territory." It called for a fundamental reorganization of the Air Defense Forces. The position of Commander of National Air Defense Forces and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Air Defense was established, and the appropriate administrative agencies were set up. The Air Defense Forces essentially became an independent branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The GKO continued to handle matters having to do with improving the organizational structure of the National Air Defense Forces.

On 22 January 1942 the GKO reviewed the "Questions of the Red Army's Air Forces" and passed a corresponding decree. It reflected for the first time in the war the concept of establishing the Air Reserve, Main Command, which was dictated by the urgent demands of the combat situation. No less important was the decree passed by the GKO on 1 October 1942: "On Improving the Training of Fighter-Pilots and the Quality of the Fighters." It contained a group of measures for gaining Soviet superiority in the air.



A trend involving the massing of personnel and equipment on the axes of the main strikes could be detected in the conduct of offensive operations as early as the winter of 1941-42. Changes occurring in methods of conducting combat operations also required corresponding organizational steps. The GKO passed the decree "On the Formation of Antitank, Howitzer, Cannon and Mortar Brigades Within the Artillery Divisions of Reserve, High Command" on 6 December 1942. This made it possible for the Supreme High Command to create greater artillery density on the axes of the main strikes in strategic operations and made it easier to maneuver the artillery.

The GKO passed the decree "On the Formation of Tank Armies With a New Organization" on 28 January 1943. Five such armies had been formed by the summer of that year, which considerably increased the Red Army's striking power and maneuverability, and made it possible to effect devastating strikes against the German fascist invaders and to conduct large offensive operations with decisive objectives.

Other decrees of the GKO were also of exceptionally great importance. Among other things, they covered questions of providing international assistance to the patriots of foreign nations in the development of their liberation armies.

The State Defense Committee established by the party Central Committee and the Soviet government functioned successfully throughout the entire Great Patriotic War. It did not relinquish its authority until the Victory had been achieved over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

GOLTS DISCUSSES RIMPAC-86 EXERCISE, WESTERN POLICY IN PACIFIC

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 86 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Golts: "Pacific Ocean in Pentagon Sights," "Sinister Look to 'Combined Squadron'," "ASEAN's Contribution," "Reduce, Not Intensify Military Confrontation in Region"]

[Text] The "combined squadron" operating in the Pacific Ocean attacked a group of enemy ships. Following intensive artillery bombardment, it landed assault troops on the enemy-occupied islands.... Readers who go in for the history of naval warfare would probably figure we were going to be looking at operations of the so-called "combined squadron" of the Japanese Imperial Fleet, which operated here in Pacific waters during the Second World War.

But no, this is the scenario for the final maneuvers tomorrow of Rimpac-86. A powerful naval force has been assembled in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands to carry out these maneuvers. Comprising this force are U.S. aircraft carriers "Ranger" and "Carl Vinson," the British carrier "Illustrious," some 50 combat vessels of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Canada and Australia and 250 aircraft. More than 50,000 military personnel of the five countries have participated in the maneuvers of Rimpac-86. In the view of the foreign press, this is the largest, most important military demonstration in the Pacific Ocean in the last 40 years.

Rimpac-86 has illuminated the essential objectives of American strategy in the Pacific Ocean with the utmost clarity. And first and foremost the openly anti-Soviet nature of this strategy. To call things by their right names, these maneuvers have taken the form of a rehearsal for aggression against the USSR. They have simulated combat engagement of the Soviet fleet and antisubmarine warfare against Soviet submarines. As has been emphasized in the foreign press, in practicing combined attacks on coastal positions and combat assaults on islands, Pentagon strategists actually had specific areas of the Soviet Far East in mind. So that the British OBSERVER could with all justification point out that Rimpac-86 represented something of a "premiere" for a new American naval strategy.

In the thinking of one of its authors, Admiral Watkins, until recently U.S. chief of naval operations, "the forward deployment of our navy must be global, and it must be immediate." "Our navy," he boasts, "will destroy Soviet forces along their forward lines of deployment and, if it becomes necessary, will

penetrate into Soviet territorial waters." The American admiral gives us to understand that plans are staked to a surprise attack, to striking first, to include striking with nuclear weapons. "The principle objective is to get the guy with the bow and arrow before he has a chance to shoot his arrow," as he puts it bluntly. With this stated reliance on nuclear arrows in mind, the recent statement by U.S. secretary of the navy Lehman that the United States has a navy which is capable of "gaining victory" in a war in the Pacific Ocean.

American planners have always anticipated an engagement of enemy forces from what they refer to as the forward positions, far from the territory of the U.S. itself. And from positions which would at the same time expose their allies to attack. And this is the role they have been assigned in the Rimpac-86 maneuvers.

For the first time in the history of these war games we are seeing the participation of a non-Pacific power—Great Britain. According to the official story, British ships are participating in Rimpac only because Washington has been "offended" by New Zealand, which, as we know, has refused to permit American ships carrying nuclear weapons entrance to its ports. So New Zealand has been "punished" by not being allowed to participate in these maneuvers. So because the gap had to be plugged, Great Britain was invited to take New Zealand's place.

In reality, though, much more serious considerations were involved here, because the one-time "sovereign of the seas" has been given quite a different role. After Great Britain agreed to participate in the Rimpac maneuvers, reports the Japanese ASAHI [transliterated], these maneuvers evolved into something that went beyond a Pacific strategy pure and simple, into an exercise conducted within the context of a global strategy.

Year in year out we see the United States attempting with a persistence worthy of better application to put together a military "superbloc," which would link NATO with its allies in the Pacific Ocean. The objective of this scheme is obvious—to make the Asian-Pacific region still another zone of military-political confrontation and to build up a solid aggressive military structure along the borders of the socialist countries in both the east and the west.

With the maneuvers around the Hawaiian Islands in full swing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger called in a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis for the zone of operations of the North Atlantic bloc to be extended to include the Persian Gulf and the Indian and Pacific Oceans. And the commander of the U.S. 3d Fleet, Admiral Moranville, in elaborating on the Pentagon chief's idea, declared that in an "emergency," the NATO countries would have to send their naval forces to the Pacific Ocean. It is significant that he made this statement while the Rimpac-86 maneuvers were under way. British participation in these maneuvers is seen by observers as something of a rehearsal for the deployment of the naval forces of other NATO countries in the Pacific Ocean as well.

The Rimpac-86 maneuvers also reflect the growing role Japan is playing in imperialist strategy in the Pacific Ocean. In increasing its role in these maneuvers several times over what it has been in past years, Japan has this year participated with eight destroyers, a submarine and naval aviation. It has been reported that a group of Japanese combat ships has been assigned "independent missions."

This is yet another indication that Tokyo wants to conduct military operations beyond the limits of its national territory. The country is now for all practical purposes orienting its military development toward the objective of establishing military control within a radius extending 1000 miles from the Japanese islands: it is building up its navy and sharply increasing the numbers of its naval aircraft. Also pointing to the far-reaching plans of Japan's strategists is the decision to create their own rapid deployment force.

The Pentagon is doing everything it can to encourage Japan's militaristic ambitions, seeing in it, as it does, a key participant with it in future military adventures. The Rimpac-86 maneuvers do not provide us with our only glimpse of the role Japan has been assigned. Here is the scenario for maneuvers which have been planned for August. These will be conducted by an American squadron led by the battleship "New Jersey" in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Far East coast. Among other things, this squadron will be simulating a strike against Soviet targets using nuclear cruise missiles. The Pentagon's strategy here calls for Japanese aircraft to provide air cover for the New Jersey and other American ships.

The participants in the Rimpac maneuvers, of course, are not the only players which figure in the Pentagon's strategic calculations with regard to the Pacific Ocean. South Korea, for example, has not been participating in these war games. Presumably because it isn't needed. American and South Korean armed forces practice cooperation each year in "Team Spirit," Asia's largest military exercises. So there actually isn't anything more that has to be done to prepare South Korea for its role as a member of this military bloc. The dictatorship there is prepared at the drop of a hat to join any military alliance.

So there we have it — Japan, South Korea and Australia. These countries constitute the framework of the Pacific branch of NATO Washington has planned. But this isn't the end of it. American politicians, it appears, are writing "three" but thinking "six," as we say. And the "six" here are the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. Washington would very much like to get these countries as deeply involved as possible in its aggressive strategy. The interest here is triggered by both the rich natural resources these countries have and in their extraordinarily advantageous geographical location—between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

A new phase in the cultivation of the ASEAN countries opened this week. With the annual conference of ASEAN foreign ministers over in Manila, in comes U.S. secretary of state Schultz.

The head of the U.S. foreign policy department was not disturbed in the slightest by the communique which had been issued at the conclusion of the conference, a communique which had expressed in the clearest possible terms the desire of the ASEAN countries for peace and a limitation of the arms race. He simply ignored the ASEAN call for continued adherence to the provisions of SALT 2. Schultz expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the desire of the ASEAN countries to make the national territories of their individual countries into nuclear-free zones. The secretary of state declared that the United States has no intention of removing its nuclear weapons from the Pacific Ocean.



Washington is sparing no effort to divert the ASEAN countries from the path of social and economic development they have chosen onto a path of confrontation. To accomplish this end it is attempting to employ the notorious "Kampuchean question." The roots of this "question" have long since been no secret. In equipping and supporting Pol Pot's bands, the United States has been deliberately aggravating the situation along the border between Thailand and Kampuchea. It is then using the tension thus created to frighten the ASEAN countries with the threat of "outside invasion." By means of such underhanded methods the American administration is trying to expand its military presence within the ASEAN countries and bring these countries under its military control.

Washington has not lost hope of being able to turn ASEAN into a military bloc under its own aegis. Pentagon strategists do not want to have to take account of the firm declarations of the majority of ASEAN leaders that they do not want to turn their association into a military alliance. They are cleverly using the delivery of military weapons to attempt gradually to turn the ASEAN countries in the direction of military integration. The long-range objective is to unify the armed forces of the ASEAN countries and make them responsible for controlling the straits of southeast Asia. A plan for complete military integration of the armed forces of the ASEAN countries has even been outlined. American plans have nothing whatsoever in common with the true national interests of the countries of the Asian-Pacific Ocean region.

Not intensification, but rather reduction in the level of military confrontation is the really urgent problem before the peoples of this part of the world. "The CPSU," emphasizes the new version of the party program, "supports joint efforts on the part of all interested countries toward the objective of insuring security in Asia and a joint search by these countries for a constructive solution of this problem." It is now vitally necessary for the peoples of Asia to undertake a joint effort to insure the security of the continent as a whole against the militaristic schemes of Washington.

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